Theorizing about board governance of nonprofit organizations : surveying the landscape by Hough, Alan et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
This is the submitted version of this conference paper: 
 
Hough, Alan and McGregor-Lowndes, Myles and Ryan, Christine M. 
(2005) Theorizing about board governance of nonprofit organizations : 
surveying the landscape. In: 34th Annual Conference of the Association for 
Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action, 17-19 
November 2005, Washington DC. (Unpublished) 
© Copyrght 2005 The authors. 
Theorizing about board governance of nonprofit organizations: 
surveying the landscape
Alan Hough
Professor Myles McGregor-Lowndes
Professor Christine Ryan*
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia
Paper presented at the 34th Annual Conference of the
Association for Research on Nonprofit Organizations and Voluntary Action
November 17 - 19, 2005
Capital Hilton Hotel, Washington DC
Abstract
Leading scholars on nonprofit governance have urged that future research be 
more informed by theory in order to promote more rigorous analysis.  The aim of 
this paper is to survey the major theories on board governance, including those 
based in the disciplines of economics, management, sociology, psychology, 
politics, history and theology, in order to respond to this challenge.  In addition, 
the relevance of these theories to a critical set of board behaviors - that is, how 
boards monitor, judge and influence organizational performance - is examined. 
Gaps in the theoretical literature are identified, and implications for public policy 
are explored.   We conclude that a multi-theory and multi-disciplinary 
perspective is needed if research on governance of nonprofit organizations is to 
be complete in scope, rich in content, and relevant.
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Theorizing about board governance of nonprofit organizations: 
surveying the landscape
Attempting to capture the totality of this diversity [of the social landscape] with  
references to a single monolithic “theory” is usually misguided.  Insights from 
several theories at different levels of analysis are appropriate for social  
landscapes. – Llewelyn 
1. Introduction
As early as 1776, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations commented on the 
dilemmas of board governance of for-profit corporations, noting that directors 
managing other people’s money would not take the same care as they would if 
the money was their own .  In the nonprofit sector, the first serious study of 
nonprofit governance was Bacon’s ‘Responsibility in the management of 
societies’ published in the New Englander in 1847 .  Despite this early 
scholarship, the study of board governance was significantly under-researched 
until the 1990s.  Writing in the context of nonprofits, Middleton  concluded in 
1987 that empirical studies of boards were ‘scarce’.  Writing in 1992, Pettigrew 
described research into boards as being in its infancy, with the extant research 
being ‘fragmented and largely nonadditive’.  Since then, however, there has been 
a ‘dramatic surge’ in research on boards in the for-profit sector  and an ‘evident 
increase’ in the nonprofit sector .  The increase in scholarship in the area is no 
doubt in part a reaction to the high profile corporate collapses such as Enron and 
World.com in the for-profit sector, and scandals such as United Way and 
Covenant House in the nonprofit sector.
Leading scholars on board governance in the nonprofit sector  have called for 
future research on nonprofit boards to be more informed by theory.  What then 
are the relevant theories and perspectives, their strengths and limitations, and 
what are the implications?  This paper surveys the theories of board governance, 
examines critiques of these theories, and considers relevant empirical evidence in 
an attempt to respond to this challenge.  
As noted, the amount of scholarship on board governance is now massive.  There 
are currently four academic journals dedicated to the issue of corporate 
governance.1 A search of the words ‘board of directors’ or ‘governance’ in 
citations or abstracts of scholarly journals on the ProQuest databases produced 
over 14000 references.  Even narrowing this search to the nonprofit sector 
produced 277 references.  Given the extent of the literature, the paper cannot be 
exhaustive.  What the paper attempts to do is to examine the extant theoretical 
literature, identifying the major theories and perspectives relevant to governance 
in an attempt to provide the theoretical platform from which to advance the 
research and debate on nonprofit governance.  The paper identifies foundational 
works on each theory, and identifies some of the key empirical studies.  Gaps in 
the theoretical literature are identified, and implications for public policy are also 
1 The journals are Corporate governance: an international review, Corporate governance: 
international journal of business in society, the Journal of Management and Governance, and 
The International Journal of Disclosure and Governance.
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explored.   We conclude that a multi-theory and multi-disciplinary perspective is 
needed if research on governance of nonprofit organizations is to be complete in 
scope, rich in content, and relevant.
In order to investigate the explanatory powers of the various theories, the paper 
examines what insights the theories offer into one critical set of board behaviors, 
namely how boards monitor, judge and influence organizational performance . 
These behaviors are considered to be critical because boards are usually legally 
responsible for managing the business and operations of the organizations they 
govern.  The insights offered by theory can variously include whether these 
behaviors are seen as the role of the board, by what methods these behaviors are 
performed, how well boards perform these behaviors, and with what effect.   
Current scholarship about board governance
This paper is not only motivated by the desire to document in one place the 
major theories and perspectives on board governance: it is also motivated by 
frustration with the state of existing analysis and debate.
First, much of the discussion about governance is about agency theory and the 
agency problem.  Without subscribing to romantic generalizations about the third 
sector, nonetheless the question must be asked whether a theory founded in self-
interest is the best place to start in analyzing governance in a sector in which 
other-regarding behavior is common.  Also, while agency theory is useful for 
thinking about the resolution of the agency problem, there are many other 
problems which deserve attention (Learmount 2003).  It is not healthy that one 
particular problem should be driving the discourse of an entire area .  Scholars of 
nonprofit governance must ensure that they do not replicate the obsession with 
agency theory of scholars of for-profit governance. 
Second, while agency theory and economics has been the subject of extensive 
research, the contributions of some other disciplines are clearly underdeveloped. 
For example, while the discipline of psychology has contributed theory on small 
group effectiveness and psychoanalytic insights, it is apparent that psychology 
could contribute much more.  This argument is developed in section 10 of the 
paper.
Third, we believe it is a fiction to conceive of the nonprofit sector as a uniform 
mass.  There are many different types of nonprofits – small and large, public-
serving and member-serving, all-volunteer and all-staff, commercially-operating 
and donative – with many gradations in between.  Some nonprofits have self-
perpetuating boards, and others are characterized by an obsessional commitment 
to democratic processes.  These nuances must be acknowledged and explored. 
This variation suggests the question of whether there should be one dominant 
theoretical analysis – be it agency theory, stakeholder theory or resource 
dependency theory.  As Ostrower and Stone (2003) have noted, the analysis of 
nonprofit governance needs to be more context specific.  
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Fourth, most researchers have made limited use of the diversity of the relevant 
theories and the connections between the theories.  For example, many authors 
fail to recognize the positivist agency theory/stewardship theory dichotomy and 
the fact that negative evidence for one theory is normally positive evidence for 
the other.  Also, the debate on team production theory has made little or no 
reference to the debate on stewardship theory, despite the central role of trust in 
both theories.  Some issues are clearly capable of being understood using 
multiple theoretical perspectives .
Finally, like other authors  we believe the pursuit of a single comprehensive 
theory of governance of nonprofit organizations is unlikely to be successful. 
There is much to be said for Bainbridge’s  argument that situation-specific mini-
theories may be more useful than attempts to build a single unified theory of 
board governance.  We have already argued that the nonprofit sector consists of 
many different organizational forms and purposes.  We would add that relevant 
theory depends on the particular research question, but the research questions 
must be understood broadly.  Hence, a multi-disciplinary and multi-theory 
perspective is needed .
Defining board governance
Most of the published definitions of ‘governance’ are of corporate governance . 
Van den Berghe and DeRidder  in their detailed comparison of the various 
definitions offered of ‘corporate governance’ note that the definitions can be 
simple or complex, with complex definitions offering normative instructions as 
to purpose and/or task.
Given that the focus of this paper is on the work of boards in directing and 
controlling their organizations in whatever manner that role is performed, a 
simple definition is to be preferred.  In this paper, ‘board governance’ is ‘the 
systems and practices by which boards direct and control entities’.  For ease of 
reference, the term ‘governance’ will be used as shorthand for ‘board 
governance’.
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Governance in the sectors
Board governance in the for-profit, public and nonprofit sectors has points of 
similarity and of difference.  For all three sectors, it can be argued that 
governance should be concerned with enabling appropriate performance and 
conformance.  However, the context in which board governance occurs varies 
considerably between and within the sectors.  
It is arguable that, after compliance with their legal responsibilities, boards of 
for-profits have a single focus, namely the optimization of returns to 
shareholders.  Among publicly listed companies, board governance exists in the 
context of active markets for performance analysis and for corporate control , 
providing a universal and instant judging system available to all players.  In these 
companies, governance might now be considered an obsession, regularly 
reinforced by very public government inquiries into corporate scandals and show 
trials of corporate offenders.  At the other end of the for-profit sector, family 
companies often reflect the psychodynamics of the family .  
In the public sector, governance is practiced in a political context.  For 
departments of State in Westminster democracies, at least at a rhetorical level, 
there remains a notion of ministerial authority and responsibility.  The division of 
responsibility between ministers and public servants, although in part regulated 
by legislation, tends to be an issue of constant tension.  These tensions can also 
extend to the boards of statutory authorities and government-owned enterprises. 
Expectations of stakeholder voice and influence, and of transparency and 
accountability, tend to be higher in the public sector than in the private sector.  
The unifying features of the third sector are that the organizations are private (i.e. 
non-government) and have a primary mission other than profit maximization for 
owners.  As there is no single guiding objective such as profit maximization, 
judgments of organizational performance in the nonprofit sector are inevitably 
multidimensional, made by different stakeholders, and usually on different bases 
.  As has been discussed, the sector in diverse in organizational form and board 
composition.
The scope of the paper
The criterion for inclusion was that the literature is (a) explicitly theoretical or 
tests theory in relation to board governance and (b) is wide in scope.  
Thus historical accounts have been excluded, except for path dependence 
accounts with their explicitly theoretical base.  Further, in order to have a 
consistent focus in the paper, we excluded board effectiveness models  as not 
being explicitly theoretical in their orientation.
The paper concentrates on theories of board governance with a relatively wide 
scope (without necessarily attempting to be all-embracing).  On this basis, the 
paper does not include social network theory  or information processing theory .
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In the next section, we offer a framework by which theories of governance might 
be catalogued.  This framework provides the basis for our discussion in sections 
3 to 9 of economic, management, sociological, psychological, political, historical 
and theological theories of board governance.  Section 10 explores the ways in 
which research on nonprofit governance might be better informed by theory, 
including commenting on the range of research problems explored, the use of 
multi-theory research designs, and areas in which research is currently 
underdeveloped.  The implications of our analysis for public policy are briefly 
explored in section 11 in which we argue that much of the public policy 
discussion has been based on the wrong questions and consequently we suggest 
some radical alternatives for the design of corporate governance systems. 
Conclusions are offered in Section 12.
2. A framework for understanding theories of board governance
Other authors have catalogued theories of board governance, for example, 
Cornforth , Hung , Stiles and Taylor  and Turnbull .  This paper differs from 
earlier works in three ways.  First, it provides a more comprehensive account of 
available theories, including several theories which are not mentioned in any of 
these works.  Thus, the scope of prior work is expanded, and comparisons and 
links between theories developed.  Second, the paper includes discussion of 
governance in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.  Although the primary 
concern of this paper is nonprofit governance, much of the relevant theory is 
derived from the for-profit sector.  Hence an understanding of the theory and 
evidence in that sector provides a foundation for understanding the theory and for 
interpreting the evidence in the third sector.  Third, the paper focuses on board 
governance in particular, rather than corporate governance in general.
The thesis of the paper is that processes of board governance are complex, and 
can only be properly understood by the adoption of a multi-disciplinary and 
multi-theory approach.   
Figure 1 classifies theories of board governance according to the discipline 
providing the underpinning analytical framework.  This framework provides the 
structure for the paper. 
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Figure 1: Theories of board governance
Economics Management Sociology Psychology Other disciplines
Agency theory
(Jensen & Meckling 1976, 
Fama & Jensen 1983)
Transaction cost economics
(Williamson 1983, 1984 & 
1985)
Team production theory
(Blair & Stout 1999)
Stewardship theory
 (Donaldson 1990)
Stakeholder theory
(Freeman 1984)
Paradox theory
(Cornforth 2003, 2004) 
Managerial hegemony theory/
Hegemony of the 
Technostructure
(Mace 1971
Mintzberg 1983
Galbraith 1974)
Institutional isomorphism
(DiMaggio & Powell 1983)
Strategic choice theory
(Child 1972)
Resource dependency theory
(Pfeffer & Salancik 1978)
Class hegemony/Elites theory
(Useem 1979, 1982)
Feminist theory
Social embeddedness theory
(Granovetter 1985)
Zald’s contingency theory
(Zald 1969)
Small group effectiveness 
theories
(Zander 1994)
Psychoanalytic theory
(Dartington 1996, 1998)
History
Path dependency theory
Politics
(March 1962)
Theology
Christian stewardship theory
(Jeavons 1994)
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Several qualifiers apply to the framework in Figure 1.  First, it is acknowledged 
that the method of classifying the theories is to some extent arbitrary.  The 
theories could be categorized on a number of different bases, for example: by the 
discipline providing the underlying framework for the theory; by distinguishing 
between those theories that assume rational-logical behaviors by boards and 
those which do not; by whether the theories are primarily descriptive, normative 
or instrumental; or by chronology of development.  No one basis of 
categorization is ideal. While our decision to classify the theories by discipline 
was arbitrary, as was the classification of some of the theories, it is argued that 
the benefit of the classes outweigh the costs because this system of classification 
facilitates understanding by the reader, and helps identify commonalities between 
the theories.  We are making no claims that the framework itself has explanatory 
power.
Second, as previously noted our criterion for inclusion was that the paper 
explicitly addresses board governance.  Thus the framework does not purport to 
identify all the contributions that various disciplines could make to thinking 
about governance.  For example, despite an extensive search of databases of 
scholarly journal articles, we have not been able to locate any articles on 
corporate governance from a Marxist perspective and hence Marxism is not 
included.  Readers of the paper will no doubt identify areas of their discipline not 
covered in this paper which could make a significant contribution to thinking 
about governance. 
Third, the appropriate presentation and classification of legal theory is a 
dilemma.  It could be presented as a separate category in its own right.  Legal 
theory includes both a contractarian and a communitarian view of the corporation 
.  The contractarian position is essentially economics’ agency theory, and will 
therefore be considered under that heading.  The communitarian view is diverse, 
but ‘shares common ground in its opposition to a strictly contract based approach 
to the definition of nonshareholder rights’.  Communitarianism closely 
corresponds to stakeholder theory , and will be dealt with under that heading. 
Therefore legal frameworks of analysis are not separately presented.
Fourth, although each theory is presented as a single entity, it is acknowledged 
that not all proponents of a theory agree with each other in all respects.  For 
example, there are wide differences in the views of proponents of stakeholder 
and feminist theories.
In discussing each theory of governance the following structure is used:
• a brief description of the theory, with an emphasis on foundational works;
• the role suggested by the theory for the board in monitoring, judging and 
influencing organizational performance;
• critiques of the theory;
• the empirical evidence in relation to the theory, in both the for-profit and 
nonprofit sectors but with an emphasis on the latter; and
• conclusions in relation to the utility of the theory.
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3. Economic theories
Economics 'is the study of how people ... [including organizations] generate, 
accumulate, allocate, distribute, and consume resources in order to create value'. . 
While the ‘black box’ of the firm/organization has been opened by economists 
only relatively recently , there is a now a substantial economic literature on how 
organizational form impacts on productive capacity.  Indeed, economics is the 
dominant analytical framework in the academic literature on governance. 
Economic theories share a common concern with efficiency, and similar, but not 
identical, assumptions about self-interested behavior.  Economics has contributed 
agency theory, transaction cost economics and team-production theory to 
thinking about governance.  Each of these theories will be discussed in turn.
3.1 Agency theory
Description of the theory: Agency theory provides the basis for most research on 
boards of directors  and is central to most of the law and economics scholarship 
on corporate law .  It is concerned with the principal-agent problem or ‘agency 
problem’, where principals engage agents to act on their behalf and the interests 
of the principals and the agents might not be aligned.  Agency theory addresses 
the problem of how to ensure that agents act in the best interest of the principals. 
Agency theory has developed along two lines of thinking: the ‘principal-agent’ 
and ‘positivist’ approaches .  Principal-agent approaches are broad, are concerned 
with the general theory of principal-agent relationships, have explored agency 
problems in a wide range of settings, and use a predominantly mathematical 
approach.  On the other hand, positivist agency theory is narrower, focusing on 
the specific issue of owners and managers of corporations.  It is based on more 
rigid assumptions such as that of goal conflict between owners and managers. 
Positivist agency theory tends to be less mathematical in approach.  It might be 
considered a special case within the broader context of principal-agent 
approaches.
In the case of board governance, the agency problem is most commonly 
discussed in the context of listed public companies, existing in active and 
informed markets for corporate control.  It is formulated with the shareholders 
being the principals and the managers as their agents, although the agency 
problem can occur between different parties and at all levels of an organization . 
Given assumptions of bounded rationality and self-interest, it is assumed the 
agent will not always act in the interests of the principal .  Positivist agency 
theory uses the metaphor of a contract to describe the relationship between 
principal and agent, and indeed views the firm as a nexus of contracts .  
While contracts are an economically efficient means of organizing and regulating 
flows of resources to and from an organization, having residual risks borne and 
residual benefits gained by owners reduces the cost of maintaining and 
monitoring contracts .  However, such an arrangement results in the agency 
problem.  Where there are a large number of owners in for-profits or in any 
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nonprofit, Fama and Jensen argue that separation of risk-bearing results in 
systems that separate decision initiation and implementation, from decision 
ratification and monitoring.  Common features of decision control systems in 
complex organizations are decision hierarchies and mutual monitoring systems. 
Fama and Jensen (1983, 311) claim the common apex of decision control in any 
organization in which agents do not bear a risk to their wealth as a consequence 
of their decisions is a board of directors with the power to hire and fire senior 
managers and to ratify and monitor the most important decisions.
Key recommendations that flow from agency theory include formal systems of 
control, budget controls and limitations, audits, and incentive systems aligning 
the interests of managers with those of principals .  In relation to boards of 
directors, recommendations include:
• in the case of public corporations, expert boards - including executive and 
non-executive directors - that limit the discretion of top managers; 
• in the case of donative nonprofits, boards largely or entirely composed of 
non-executive directors (including donors) in order to offer assurance to 
donors that collusion and expropriation of donations will not occur; and
• fixed-term appointments of managers in complex nonprofits 
.
Agency theorists do not necessarily believe that the positivist assumption of goal 
conflict between principals and agents is accurate, but do believe the assumption 
allows useful modeling and generates useful predictions .  In a theory-building 
article, Hendry  relaxes the assumption of self-seeking behavior by agents to 
explore issues of honest incompetence on the part of agents and the difficulty for 
principals in specifying objectives.  The resulting predictions are largely the 
same as those of standard agency theory.
Ben Ner and Van Hoomissen  combine a stakeholder approach with agency 
theory to argue that nonprofit organizational law should be based on enhancing 
the rights of consumers, donors and sponsors.  They claim such an approach 
would reduce the incidence of fraud and mismanagement, as well as result in 
more economically efficient outcomes.  Brown 
argues that in nonprofits agency theory might need to be reconceptualized as 
being concerned with adherence to organizational mission or purpose, rather than 
adherence to owner interests.
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance: Monitoring of organizational performance by boards is crucial in 
agency theory.  Despite this, Jensen and Meckling  state they have ‘little which 
could be glorified by the title of a “Theory of Monitoring” and yet this is a 
crucial building block of the analysis’.  Fama and Jensen  argue that, at least for 
public corporations, boards must have access to information from top managers 
as well as lower level managers in order to be appropriately informed.  Under 
agency theory, the board’s influence on organizational performance is directed 
towards ensuring that management interests and the interests of residual 
claimants remain aligned.  
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Critiques of the theory: Agency theory can be questioned on a number of bases, 
which are very briefly stated here.  The applicability of the notion of principal 
has been questioned.  Some nonprofit organizations, such as trusts, do not have 
identifiable ‘owners’ or members .  Even if the nonprofit does have members, 
membership is often small with no residual capital committed.  Even in public 
for-profit corporations, the principal-agent relationship is often ambiguous . 
Some authors deny that, in law, shareholders are owners; they argue the 
shareholder agency conception of the firm is a myth perpetuated in Anglo-
American systems of corporate governance .  In some situations, residual risk is 
borne by parties other than the shareholders, for example certain corporate 
borrowing and workforce-contracting arrangements (Blair and Stout 2001, 411-
416).   Blair and Stout (2001, 418) go so far as to argue that shareholders are 
‘almost never’ the sole residual risk bearers in a listed corporation. 
Further, agency theory has also been criticized for concentrating on issues of 
control and motivation, to the detriment of other issues determining 
organizational performance such as managerial competence .2  It has limited 
regard for the structural, political, cognitive and cultural contexts of boards  or to 
processes of social psychology .  It has been argued that agency theory 
assumptions are more appropriate in Western countries, like the US, than in 
countries which are more collectivist, hierarchical, risk averse and timid in 
culture .3  Agency theory has been criticized for ignoring the reality of ‘other 
regarding’ behavior in organizations .  It assumes opportunistic behavior on the 
part of managers – ‘guilt by axiom’ – with any other behavior being beyond the 
scope of the theory .4   It has been argued that if goal conflict and information 
asymmetry are regarded as variables, and the possibility of goal conflict among 
principals is allowed, then very different scenarios will result from those 
proposed by positivist agency theory .
Further, positivist agency theory has been criticized for its ‘capability of 
subsuming a wide range of mutually contradictory propositions’ .  The 
assumption in agency theory that it is only the agents who might not perform 
their end of the bargain has also been questioned .  Significantly, Jensen  – who is 
a proponent of agency theory – has argued that, in practice, capital markets have 
been the predominant control on management and the concept of outside 
directors with little equity in the company effectively monitoring and disciplining 
managers has proven ‘hollow at best’.  Finally, it can be argued that agency 
theory is ideologically-driven and one-sided:  it highlights the possibility of self-
seeking behavior by persons other than owners, but not the possibility of 
exploitation and other wrongdoing by owners .  
2 The response of Hendry (2002) to this argument has already been stated.
3 For a discussion of cultural differences in corporate governance, see Licht (2001).
4 However, Hendry (2002) would reply that the assumptions do not matter if the resulting 
predictions are true.
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The empirical evidence: Many of the empirical studies on agency theory in the 
for-profit sector examine whether there is a link between board composition and 
shareholder value.  Based on two meta-analyses , Daily, Dalton and Cannella 
conclude the empirical evidence in support of agency theory is ‘scant’.   Dalton 
and Dalton , in a article summarizing the relevant meta-analyses, write bluntly 
that ‘it is apparent that agency theory has limited explanatory power for 
corporate governance research’.  Stiles and Taylor  in their review of empirical 
studies summarize the evidence as being ‘equivocal’.   Hermalin and Weisbach , 
in summarizing empirical studies published in the economic literature, conclude 
the proportion of non-executive directors is not correlated with firm 
performance, but is correlated in the theorized direction in relation to CEO 
replacement in the event of poor corporate performance, responses to hostile 
takeovers, ‘poison pill’ provisions, and CEO compensation.  However, they 
caution there is a real possibility of spurious correlations in these studies. 
Hermalin and Weisbach argue the role the board actually plays will depends on 
firm performance and the consequent bargaining position of the CEO .  They 
caution that game theory modeling of board behaviors might be inappropriate as 
‘individuals appear to be governed more by issues of emotion, fairness, and norm 
adherence5 than is consistent with standard economic models’ .
In the nonprofit sector, there are useful case studies of scandals in which chief 
executive officers have inappropriately pursued personal aggrandizement and 
wealth at the expense of their organizations .  Such case studies support agency 
theory arguments about the conflicting interests of principals and agents, and the 
need for active oversight by boards.   Empirical studies that have explicitly used 
an agency theory approach in the nonprofit sector are Callen and Falk , Callen, 
Klein and Tinkelman , Miller  and Olson .  Callen and Falk find no relationship 
between the proportion of insider directors on the boards of 72 Canadian 
charities with a health-specific focus and either technical efficiency or allocative 
efficiency.  In a later study, Callen, Klein and Tinkelman report results consistent 
with agency theory, namely a statistically significant association between the 
presence of major donors on the board and on the finance committee, and 
indicators of organizational efficiency such as the ratio of administrative to total 
expenses.  However, Callen and colleagues  acknowledge that they demonstrate 
correlation not causation, and accept the results are also consistent with a 
multiple-constituency view of organizational effectiveness and with institutional 
theory.  Further, they accept that a focus on such ratios may be functional or 
dysfunctional.  In a qualitative study of 12 nonprofit boards, Miller  found 
agency theory to be deficient in explaining nonprofit board monitoring behavior 
as board members do not assume goal conflict between principals and agents.6 
Olson  found partial support for agency theory-based hypotheses in a quantitative 
analysis of relationships between board and CEO demographics, and revenue and 
gift income.  However, Olson’s study had a low response rate of 10.2% and the 
independent variables selected for study could equally relate to other theoretical 
approaches such as resource dependency theory.  Brown  finds empirical support 
5 See also the work of Ocasio (1994) on boards as normative arenas.
6 The failure to assume self-interested behavior by the CEO was also a feature in one of the cases 
studied by Edwards and Cornforth (2003, 94).  In the particular case, board monitoring was 
associated with the directors’ fears of not performing legal duties rather than any distrust of 
management. 
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for his reconceptualized version of agency theory (described above) in a study of 
US nonprofits.
In summary, the empirical evidence about the theory is equivocal.  This is true 
for both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.
Conclusion: Agency theory focuses on the issue of attempting to ensure that 
agents act in the best interests of principals.  It highlights the monitoring role of 
the board and the importance of the provision of information by management to 
the board for monitoring purposes.  
Given that there are numerous examples where the self-interested behaviors of 
some CEOs have been to the detriment of organizations and stakeholders, there is 
a compelling logic in agency theory’s concern for control.  Each new scandal 
results in calls for yet more regulation based in agency theory.  However, it can 
be argued that this self-interested behavior is only one of a range of human 
behaviors.  
Indeed, the empirical evidence for positivist agency theory is equivocal, in both 
the for-profit and nonprofit sectors.  Agency theory is useful in analyzing the 
principal-agent problem, but explains only some aspects of governance.  As 
discussed in this paper, many other issues of nonprofit governance deserve 
attention in addition to the agency problem.
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3.2 Transaction cost economics
Description of the theory: A second economic theory is transaction cost 
economics (TCE), most often associated with the work of Williamson .  TCE 
shares with agency theory the assumptions of bounded rationality and self-
interest, which are said to be deep in human nature .  One of the key differences 
between the theories is their starting points: agency theory is concerned with the 
agency problem, whereas TCE is concerned with the broader question of 
efficiency in transaction costs .
TCE contends that the purpose of economic organization, including governance 
structures, ‘is to economize on the costs of transacting over time’ , including 
minimizing the impact of informational asymmetries where parties have made 
firm-specific investments.  Writing of the manufacturing sector, Williamson 
argues the principal purpose of the board is ‘to safeguard those who face a 
diffuse but significant risk of expropriation because the assets in question are 
numerous and ill-defined, and cannot be protected in a well-focused, transaction-
specific way’.
Williamson  identifies three situations regarding investments in the firm, whether 
they be of labor, capital, or supplies.  The first situation is where the assets are 
general purpose and not transaction-specific, for example, non-specialized 
manual labor.  In this case, normal market contracting protections suffice and 
there is no need for additional safeguards.  Board representation of parties in this 
situation would lack economic purpose.   The second situation is where the assets 
are transaction-specific, and would attract a premium price for the consequent 
risks unless safeguards can be devised.  An example would be shareholders in 
for-profit corporations.   Board representation and voting of parties in this 
circumstance may be appropriate.  The third situation is where the assets are 
transaction-specific but contractual safeguards such as penalty provisions for 
early termination and arbitration arrangements  are sufficient to protect the 
interests of the parties.  Parties in these circumstances might be included on the 
board for information purposes but do not require voting representation.
According to Williamson , shareholders cannot be in the third category because 
the diffuse character of their investments makes safeguards other than board 
protection impractical.  Whether other parties are in the second situation is a 
question of the facts of the specific organization.
The application of TCE to nonprofit governance is perplexing (for example the 
case of nonprofits largely funded by government, with members making token 
contributions through membership fees), with Williamson  stating ‘further 
inquiry’ is needed.  Although TCE has been applied to nonprofit organizations , 
regrettably there appear to be no studies examining nonprofit governance from a 
TCE perspective. 
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance: Williamson  states that, in order to effectively discharge their roles, 
board members need ‘to learn a great deal about the overall character and agenda 
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of the corporation’.  Elements of this process would include timely access to 
internal performance measures, the ability to authorize audits for special 
purposes, being informed of key proposals before their implementation, and 
otherwise reviewing and monitoring the organization’s management. 
Critiques of the theory:  Only those criticisms relevant to TCE’s view of 
governance are reported here.  As with agency theory, TCE has been criticized 
for ignoring the diversity of human behavior: both rational and non-rational, and 
self-regarding and other-regarding .   TCE maintains a fiction of self-interested 
maximizers, in the face of evidence to the contrary .  TCE’s application to the 
nonprofit sector has been criticized for ignoring other equally valid explanations 
for phenomena .
The empirical evidence: Writing of both agency theory and TCE, Stiles and 
Taylor  conclude the evidence for these theories is ‘equivocal’.   As discussed in 
section 3.1, Callen and Falk  use agency theory and TCE assumptions to examine 
the impact of nonprofit board composition on technical and allocative 
efficiencies, but find no relationship.
Conclusion: Although starting from a different point, TCE shares assumptions 
and conclusions of agency theory.  The theory draws attention to the costs of 
organization, and in particular, to the most efficient means of acquiring and 
coordinating resources.  According to the theory, boards exist in order to ensure 
that those making organization-specific investments, which cannot be 
appropriately guarded by other means, have such investments protected.
TCE might have explanatory power in relation to the existence of the nonprofit 
form (see references cited in the introduction to this section).  It might explain 
governance of professional and trade organizations, where the members’ 
investment in the organization is often significant and their interests are not 
otherwise readily protected as a group.  However, as previously discussed, it is 
not apparent how TCE explains governance arrangements in some other 
categories of nonprofits.
3.3 Team production theory
Description of the theory: A third economic theory is team production theory. 
Whereas both agency theory and TCE assume the primacy of shareholders in for-
profit corporations, team production theorists reject this doctrine.  Instead, they 
argue that the role of the board is to govern the organization in the interest of the 
organization itself and, in particular, to mediate between members of the 
‘production team’.  
Ironically, team production theory is founded in the work of economists Alchian 
and Demsetz , who write from an agency theory perspective.  Legal scholars 
Blair and Stout  build on this work to develop a distinct theory.  This section 
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begins by discussing the work of Alchian and Demsetz, and then explains how 
Blair and Stout have developed their work.
Alchian and Demsetz  describe team production as production involving the use 
of several types of resources with different owners, with the output of the whole 
being greater than the output achievable with the individual resources.  The 
problem of team production is that individual productivity is not directly 
observable, and economic analysis suggests that shirking is inevitable.  In the 
(closely-held) classical firm, the problem of shirking can be overcome by having 
a monitor who is a residual claimant, who is the central party to all contracts, 
who has the right to vary team membership, and who has the capacity to sell this 
right.  In the case of publicly-listed corporations, the monitor must coordinate 
decision-making across a wide group of owners.  Delegation of authority in 
relation to contracting and monitoring to a smaller group is economically 
efficient .  Alchian and Demsetz  posit that in nonprofits, greater shirking should 
be expected because of the absence of owner incentive to maximize returns.
Blair and Stout  build on the analysis of Alchian and Demsetz in relation to 
public for-profit companies.  They suggest the role of board of directors in public 
companies is that of mediating hierarch, ‘to coordinate the activities of the team 
members, allocate the resulting production, and mediate disputes among team 
members over that allocation’ .  Further, Blair and Stout claim that team 
production theory explains current US corporate law regimes.  From their 
perspective, public corporation law eliminates the role of the shareholder as 
principal.  Primacy is given to the corporation itself, not shareholders, and the 
law recognizes others’ interests.  The role of the board is one of fiduciary, not 
that of agent.  The board, independent of all team players, protects the enterprise-
specific investments of all members of the corporate team and tries to maximize 
the economic value of the firm’s assets.   The view that shareholders are not 
owners has also been expressed in relation to English corporate law .  
Blair and Stout argue there are two factors motivating directors to do their job 
well.  First, there are disclosure and audit rules .  Secondly, there is the self-belief 
of directors that they ought to behave in a trustworthy way.  They assert boards 
rely on the assumption that ‘at least some people, at least to some extent, at least 
some of the time, are capable of looking out for the interests of others – even 
when they reap no direct economic benefit from doing so’ .  Trustworthy 
behavior might also be motivated by an enforceable duty of loyalty, procedural 
rules, and ‘soft’ actions such as judicial exhortations (‘dicta’), promotion of a 
group ethos, and mutually-reinforcing trustworthy behaviors of other directors .   
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance:  The issue of board monitoring and judging organizational 
performance is not fully addressed in team production theory.  However, it is 
clearly consistent with the theory for the board to seek to monitor, judge and 
influence organizational performance so far as it seeks to protect the interests of 
all team members and advance the economic value of the corporation .  However, 
Blair and Stout   see the board as providing a incentive to management to resolve 
problems among members of the production team on a collegial basis without 
reference to ‘ a disinterested – but potentially erratic or ill-informed – hierarch’.
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When discussing team production, Mitchell  argues for the abandonment of ‘the 
American “monitocracy”’.  This does not require ‘the complete dismantling of 
monitoring systems … but it does suggest a deemphasis on monitoring and 
agency cost problems and a greater emphasis on structures and incentives to 
build loyalty’ .
To conclude, the issue of monitoring is an area where Blair and Stouts’ views are 
currently underdeveloped.  
Critiques of the theory: Only criticisms relevant to our present purposes will be 
summarized here.  First, in the view of some scholars, contrary to the assertions 
of Blair and Stout, shareholders do have legal primacy over other stakeholders . 
According to these scholars, the law imbues shareholders with more rights than 
other members of the production team such as management, employees, or 
debtors.  Second, if the board is an independent mediating hierarch between team 
members, then – by definition – in for-profit companies it only applies to 
publicly-listed companies that lack a controlling shareholder and which 
somehow have escaped the market for corporate control .7  Blair and Stout may 
have been better to present their arguments for a team production theory of 
governance in normative terms, rather than assert the theory has descriptive or 
explanatory power .  Neither of the criticisms listed so far are valid if the theory 
is viewed in normative terms.
Third, it has been argued the independent board in a team production theory 
schema will fail to protect the interests of team members, as directors have no 
apparent incentive to maximize the welfare of the team .  Fourth, it is argued that 
the theory fails to offer any insights into the basis on which the board should 
make its judgments as the mediating hierarch, and how the board acting in that 
role constitutes an efficient solution to the problems of team production .  Finally, 
like other organizational economic theories, team production theory can be 
criticized for being amoral and under-socialized , with no race, class or gender 
perspective .
It is ironic the theory is meant to overcome self-seeking behaviors in team 
production, yet assumes some level of trustworthiness on the part of the board of 
directors itself.  It is not at all clear why the theory assumes trustworthy 
behaviors on the part of the board, but not on the part of management or other 
members of the production team.  Mitchell  argues that, as team production 
theory assumes trustworthy behavior on the part of directors, a theory of team 
production requires a theory of trust, and trust in the governance of a corporation 
is interdependent on trust in the management.  Perhaps there will be a 
convergence of team production and stewardship theories over time, or team 
production theory will otherwise metamorphose to embrace trust more widely.
7 Ironically, this suggests the theory might have more relevance to nonprofits than the domain of 
publicly-listed for-profit firms for which the theory was originally developed.
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The empirical evidence: So far, there are no published empirical studies directly 
using team production theory.8, 9
Conclusion: Team production theory departs from the orthodox conceptualization 
of the relationship between the company and its shareholders.  In the for-profit 
sector, it challenges the doctrine of shareholder primacy, and recognizes that the 
interests of other members of the production team are also worthy of protection 
through board governance arrangements. 
Nonetheless, it is arguable that team production theory suffers from a significant 
logical inconsistency in relation to its treatment of trust and motivation.  Further, 
the theory offers little of benefit to understanding how boards monitor, judge and 
influence organizational performance, beyond the general point that boards might 
play a mediating role in protecting the enterprise-specific investments of all team 
members.  
3.4 Summarizing the contributing of economic theories
In summary, economic theories of governance believe that the role of boards is to 
increase the productive capacity of organizations, which is a worthy goal for 
most organizations.  Agency theory and transaction-costs economics, despite 
their different starting points, come to similar conclusions about the role of 
boards in protecting the organization.  Team production theory offers a somewhat 
different perspective, arguing that boards should protect the organization-specific 
investments of all members of the production team.  Economic theories are an 
essential element in developing a holistic understanding of board governance. 
For example, despite our considerable reservations about the use of agency 
theory as a single theory of governance, the regular - albeit exceptional - cases of 
scandal demonstrate that it is essential element in understanding the roles that 
boards can play.
4. Management theories
The discipline of management is concerned with the ‘set of activities (including 
planning and decision making, organizing, leading, and controlling) directed at 
an organization's resources (human, financial, physical, and information), with 
the aim of achieving organizational goals in an efficient and effective manner' . 
The discipline thus has a wider perspective than the concern for productive 
efficiency that characterizes economics.  It seeks to suggest the best means of 
8 There is some indirect evidence in support of team production theory.  Around two-thirds of 
firms undertaking initial public offerings adopt some form of anti-takeover provisions, which 
might be explained by the need to protect the enterprise-specific investments of the firm’s 
managers and employees (Blair and Stout 2001).
9 The forthcoming PhD thesis of Ms Annie Liu of Queensland University of Technology 
exploring the relevance of team production theory to the governance arrangements of one 
nonprofit organization will be the first empirical study published explicitly using team production 
assumptions.
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coordinating and controlling entities.  The discipline has made diverse 
contributions to understanding of governance, namely stewardship theory, 
stakeholder theory, paradox theory, and managerial and technostructural 
hegemony theories.  
4.1 Stewardship theory
Description of the theory: In this review, stewardship theory has been classified 
under the discipline of management, although its proponents argue its roots are in 
sociology and psychology .  It might equally be regarded as a special case within 
the broader conception of agency theory, the case where managers are motivated 
to act in the best interests of their principals .  
Whereas positivist agency theory assumes opportunistic managers, stewardship 
theory makes the reverse assumption, i.e. managers are intrinsically motivated to 
be good stewards of the interests of the owners .  .. Consistent with the prediction 
of Hansmann , there is evidence that workers and managers in the nonprofit 
sector have higher levels of intrinsic motivation than their for-profit colleagues .
Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson  propose that managers are more likely to be 
stewards when they:
• identify with the organization they serve, especially the organization’s goals;
• use personal power, more than coercive power;
• are more involvement-oriented, rather than control-oriented, in their 
management philosophy; and
• operate in a collectivist culture, as opposed to an individualist culture.
It might be hypothesized that these conditions are more likely to be true in the 
nonprofit sector than in for-profits.
The purpose of the board in stewardship theory is to provide ‘clear, consistent 
role expectations and authorize and empower senior management’ . The 
recommendations for practice that flow from stewardship theory are:
• the roles of board chair and CEO should be vested in one person, in order to 
maximize information, knowledge and commitment ;
• there should be a high proportion of executive directors on the board;
• smaller board size promotes board effectiveness and organizational 
performance;
• the interests of board members and managers (cf., board members and 
shareholders) should be aligned; and
• boards should seek longer tenure .
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance: In relation to monitoring and judgment, the theory does not 
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emphasize, as does agency theory, full and rigorous disclosure of information on 
performance to the board .  However, it has been argued that stewardship still 
requires a system of board monitoring in order to ensure that the resources are 
used in the best interests of the organization   In relation to board influence on 
organizational performance, it can be inferred that the board’s role would be one 
of supporting management, and would include such actions as acting as a 
sounding board to the CEO.
Critiques of the theory: Stewardship theorists are their own critics.  They have 
always recognized the possibility that agency theory and stewardship theory 
might both be true in their own domains, but not outside them .  Therefore, they 
suggest a search for what ‘switching rules’ might apply, i.e. what determines that 
in one context the theory is valid and in another it is not .  More recently, Davis, 
Schoorman and Donaldson  have stated that principals within organizations are 
likely to have agency relationships with some managers and stewardship 
relationships with others, and that these relationships can change over time.
The empirical evidence: Stiles and Taylor  describe the evidentiary base for the 
study of stewardship theory in the for-profit sector as ‘slight’.  As stewardship 
theory makes opposite assumptions to agency theory, studies which support 
agency theory must contradict stewardship theory, and vice-versa.  Given the 
evidence in support of agency theory is said to be equivocal, the evidence in 
support of stewardship theory might also be regarded as equivocal.  
There is no empirical research published on the nonprofit sector that explicitly 
uses stewardship theory.  However, for the reasons just argued, the empirical 
studies in the nonprofit sector previously detailed about agency theory are 
relevant.  These results might be summarized as equivocal and mixed.  
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Conclusion: It can be argued that stewardship theory, based in the belief that 
most managers are motivated to act as stewards, is more realistic in its 
assumptions than economic theories.   Especially in some areas of the nonprofit 
sector, other-regarding behavior is the norm and thus stewardship theory may be 
particularly appropriate to the sector.  Research testing stewardship theory in 
nonprofit settings is to be encouraged.
Stewardship theory recognizes its limitations.  As the cases of scandal 
demonstrate, organizations must have some protection from the occasional 
incidences of corrupt and self-serving managers.  Thus stewardship theory cannot 
explain – and does pretend to explain – all governance relationships and 
behaviors.  
4.2 Stakeholder theory
Description of the theory: ‘Stakeholder theory’, as the term is used in this paper, 
was developed in the context of business.  Therefore, it can be viewed as a 
management theory.  Like team production theorists, stakeholder theorists reject 
the assumption of shareholder primacy and argue for a wider view of board 
responsibility.  Unlike team production theorists, they see board responsibility as 
extending to all stakeholders, not just members of the production team. 
Proponents of stakeholder theory argue that the purpose of a firm is to coordinate 
stakeholder interests .10  Stakeholders can be identified on the basis of who is 
affected by or can affect the organization’s purpose  or on the basis of the ‘actual 
or potential harms and benefits that they experience or anticipate experiencing as 
a result of the firm’s actions or inactions’ .
What is striking about Freeman’s  earliest writing on the stakeholder theory of 
the board is the tentative and cautious nature of his comments.  Freeman argues 
that, at a minimum, a board must be aware of its impact on key stakeholder 
groups, but says they should be responsive to the interests of stakeholders.  He 
stops short of recommending direct stakeholder representation on the board and 
instead suggests that efforts to improve board functioning may be more 
important.  Freeman offers the stakeholder theory of the firm as having 
normative and instrumental value.  However, in this early writing, he suggests a 
menu of options, rather than one correct view. 
In later writing, Evan and Freeman  suggest a more radical version of stakeholder 
theory.  They propose that boards should have the duty to act in the interests of 
the corporation and its stakeholders.  At least the boards of publicly-traded 
corporations should be comprised of representatives of employees, customers, 
suppliers, stockholders, the local community, and of the corporation itself. 
Directors would not necessarily have equal voting rights, but all directors would 
have a duty of care to all stakeholder groups.
Evidence in support of stakeholder theory includes the example of the Bhopal 
disaster.  Green  argues the failure of Union Carbide’s management to respond to 
10 Thomas Donaldson, who writes on stakeholder theory, is not to be confused with Lex 
Donaldson, who writes on stewardship theory.
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reports of the poor state of repair at the plant can be seen ‘as the outcome of a 
chain of business reasoning predicated on the shareholder model’.
Stakeholder theory can be descriptive, instrumental or normative .  In its 
descriptive aspect, stakeholder theory has been used to describe the way directors 
think of organizational constituencies.  In one study, for-profit directors when 
asked about the legitimacy of expectations of various stakeholders gave highest 
ranking, in order of importance, to customers and government, shareholders, 
employees and society .  Instrumentally, the theory helps organizations in 
thinking about the connection between stakeholder management and the 
achievement of corporate objectives.  In its normative aspect, stakeholder theory 
suggests guidelines for the operation of organizations.  
As already noted, stakeholder theorists contest the primacy of shareholders 
among corporate stakeholders.  Some stakeholder theorists argue that 
shareholders have little moral and limited financial commitment to the firms in 
which they invest, and certainly no more commitment than employees . They 
assert that the concept of managers serving shareholders, instead of serving 
stakeholders, is ‘morally untenable’ .
In stakeholder theory, the role of the board is to ensure the ‘maximum possible 
value is generated  … for the benefit of all stakeholders’ .  Consistent with the 
theory, boards might include stakeholder representatives .
Kay and Silberston  offer a trusteeship model of the corporation, combining 
elements of both stakeholder theory and team production theory.  They reject the 
concept of shareholders as owners.  Instead, they argue the role of directors 
should be to promote the interests of the firm and to balance the claims of 
stakeholders.  
In the nonprofit sector, the involvement of stakeholders is less controversial and 
more common than in the for-profit sector , although these practices are not 
always discussed in terms of stakeholder theory.  The principle of involving one 
key stakeholder group, namely consumers, has been increasingly popular over 
recent years .  
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance: The implications of stakeholder theory are that the board monitors 
and judges organizational performance from the perspective of the multiple 
stakeholders and seeks to influence organizational performance on their behalf. 
This would include resolving goal conflicts where the goals of the diverse 
stakeholders are not consistent.11  Stakeholder theory also suggests boards should 
report regularly to stakeholders on matters relevant to the individual stakeholder 
groups .  Hill and Jones  stress the importance of monitoring devices to reduce 
information asymmetry among stakeholders.
11 See our discussion in section 7 on political theories of governance.
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Critiques of the theory: Donaldson and Preston  note the descriptive, instrumental 
and normative uses of the theory lead to ‘less rigorous thinking and analysis than 
the stakeholder concept requires’.  As a theory of organizations, it is claimed that 
stakeholder theory is seriously underdeveloped  and a ‘weak theory’ .  The theory 
is said to be non-scientific , and vague and located in a US cultural context . 
Perhaps it is ‘more a vision and a narrative about a company that a real theory’ 
Sternberg  is unrelenting in her criticism of the normative use of stakeholder 
theory, arguing it is fundamentally incompatible with business, as the goal of 
balancing benefits between stakeholders is inherently unworkable.  Sternberg 
notes that the theory offers no guidance on how goal conflict is to be resolved. 
She notes that while balance is necessary, it is usually achieved according to the 
substantive goal of the organization, not the competing interests of stakeholders.
The empirical evidence: Hillman, Keim and Luce  found few associations 
between stakeholder representation on the board and stakeholder management 
indicators in a study of 250 large US firms.   In the nonprofit sector, there has 
been limited empirical research.  Barrett’s single case study concludes that 
stakeholder theory is of value in understanding nonprofits, but concedes other 
theoretical frameworks highlight the importance of external stakeholders . 
Hardina’s  study of 46 US nonprofits concluded that board representation by 
consumers had a ‘limited effect’ on organizational culture.
Conclusion: Stakeholder theory does appear to have descriptive power in 
explaining how directors approach their role.  Especially in the nonprofit sector, 
stakeholder understandings of governance are likely to have an inherent appeal to 
many practitioners, for both ethical and pragmatic reasons.   A multi-constituency 
view of organizational performance reflects the reality of the environment in 
which most nonprofits operate, and many nonprofit organizations seek to 
establish sound relationships with key players in their operating environment.  
Nonetheless, as has been noted, stakeholder theory is one of the most 
controversial theories of governance and critics have challenged the theory on a 
number of bases, including whether it actually deserves the title ‘theory’. 
Further, the argument for the primacy of mission over the interests of particular 
stakeholders appears compelling, albeit that the mission is not necessarily fixed 
over time.
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4.3 Paradox theory
Description of the theory: So far the theories presented have a rational-linear 
epistemology.  In contrast, paradox theory argues that such approaches are 
simplistic and that organizations are inherently paradoxical .
It is important to note that paradox theory moves beyond the ‘either/or’ 
assumptions of contingency theory, to embrace the possibility of ‘both’ .
There are three general strategies for positively managing paradox, all based on 
exploring rather than suppressing paradoxical tensions .  First, the paradox can be 
accepted, with individuals learning to live with the tension.  Second, the paradox 
can be confronted, and accommodations made between the competing 
perspectives.  Third, the paradox might be transcended by developing more 
sophisticated understandings of the issues. 
Paradox theory has been proposed as a means to understand both for-profit and 
nonprofit governance.  Sundaramurthy and Lewis  embrace both agency theory 
and stewardship theory to hypothesize that there can be dysfunctional reinforcing 
cycles of collaboration between board and management, as well as dysfunctional 
reinforcing cycles of board control.  They theorize that it is possible to build self-
correcting cycles by embracing both trust and distrust, and embracing both 
diversity of views – and shared understandings – among board and management. 
Cornforth  argues that paradox theory can help integrate other theories of 
governance.
Three paradoxes have been identified in for-profit governance .  First, the board 
is the ‘fountain of power’, yet power is normally exercised by top management. 
Second, board members require intimate knowledge of the organization, yet need 
to be independently-minded in their judgments and decision-making.  Third, the 
board needs both trusting familiarity of a group, yet directors who are willing to 
raise critical questions.   In relation to nonprofit governance, other paradoxes 
identified include the tension between having boards democratically elected and 
the need for boards to have expertise, the tension in the role of boards between 
conformance and performance, and the tension for boards between controlling 
and collaborating with management .
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance:  Demb and Neubauer  note that directors must gain sufficient 
knowledge of the organization to exercise critical judgment, yet not get 
enmeshed in detail.  They suggest a range of strategies relevant to monitoring, 
judging and influencing organizational performance: boards including both 
inside and outside directors; outside directors having the opportunity to access 
information through formal and informal channels; outside directors having the 
opportunity to discuss strategy; boards meeting regularly (i.e. more than 
quarterly); using committees to provide detailed insight into issues; using 
outsider-dominated nominating committees; having smaller boards of eight to ten 
people; and establishing clearly the board’s purpose .  As already noted, 
Sundamurthy and Lewis  suggest that boards should act in ways that are both 
trustful and distrustful of management.  Ryan, Chait and Taylor  note the paradox 
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that a board’s work might be like that of a firefighter: rarely called to act, but 
vitally important they be trained, equipped and ready for action.   Other practical 
implications of paradox theory for board understanding of and influence on 
organizational performance might include recognition that:
• individual board members and managers will always understand 
organizational performance in differing ways, using differing sources of 
information, and applying differing weights to those sources;
• the board is both potent and impotent in influence; and
• board attempts to influence organizational performance are likely to have 
paradoxical effects, sometimes having positive intended consequences and 
sometimes having negative unintended consequences.
Critiques of the theory: Two criticisms can be made of paradox theory.  First, it is 
more an approach to resolving contradictory theories and evidence, rather than a 
specific framework for theory building about governance.12  Second, at this stage, 
paradox theory in the context of governance has not been tested using 
quantitative techniques.  Paradox theory requires different research designs and 
methods to those typically used in management research .
The empirical evidence:  Demb and Neubauers’  multinational qualitative study 
identified the three key paradoxes previously reported, and suggested board 
design is like bridge design in that there are different, but equally effective, 
solutions.  Gabrielsson and Winlund  in a study of the control and service roles of 
boards of Swedish small and medium enterprises demonstrated a high correlation 
between these roles, suggesting the roles coexist rather than are mutually 
contradictory.  Chait, Taylor and Holland  in their qualitative study of boards of 
private higher education institutions reported that effective boards ‘were more 
inclined to think “both/and” rather than “either/or” and to describe board actions 
with multiple objectives derived from the use of multiple frames’.  This finding 
is all the more significant because the authors did not explicitly use paradox 
theory to inform their study.
Conclusion: Paradox theory usefully reminds researchers to move beyond 
oversimplified and polarized notions and to embrace the possibilities of 
complexity and contradiction.  It offers a way in which apparently conflicting 
theories of governance might be simultaneously true.  Paradox theory appears to 
have interesting potential in the empirical investigation of governance 
effectiveness.  While some theories suggest, and board effectiveness models 
urge, that boards demonstrate more of one set of behaviours than others (for 
example, more control than service and resourcing), it is possible that effective 
boards demonstrate more of ‘everything’ (for example, more control, more 
service and more resourcing).    However, at this stage, paradox theory is more a 
general approach to understanding complexity than an explicit framework of 
governance.
12 Demb and Neubauer (1992), however, provide a good example of how paradox theory can be 
used to generate recommendations for governance.
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4.4 Managerial hegemony and hegemony of the technostructure
Description of the theory: Hegemony refers to the concept of predominant power. 
Although the two theories of managerial hegemony and hegemony of the 
technostructure are distinct in that they have different views as to who is in 
control, both views share a common element in disputing that owners and boards 
are in control of corporations. Hence, they will be discussed together.  
Managerial hegemony theory has its origins in the 1932 classic work of Berle 
and Means, who noted of the shareholder, that ‘his vote, if he has one, is rarely 
capable of being used as a vehicle of democratic control’ .  Berle and Means 
asserted that management, rather than the ownership, controls the modern 
corporation.
Although adopting a contingency view of board-management power, Mintzberg 
suggests ‘board approval of management decisions and performance under 
normal circumstances tends to be a forgone conclusion’.  Mintzberg argues that 
boards under normal conditions are passive and subject to the guidance of senior 
management.
An early empirical study of for-profit directors suggested that directors saw 
themselves as pawns of management .  However, the dynamics of governance 
have changed and for-profit directors no longer see themselves in this way .  A 
‘lighter’ version of the theory has emerged which acknowledges that, while 
directors are not pawns, CEOs nonetheless remain dominant over directors at 
most times because the CEO has greater access to information and more time, 
and because of boardroom norms .  
While managerial hegemony might be attributed to a Machiavellian use of power 
by the CEO, benign explanations exist.  In the for-profit sector, it can be argued 
that the emergence of ‘managerial capitalism’ to replace family and financial 
capitalism was economically efficient, as it was only managers who had the 
necessary information, time and experience to operate large multi-unit 
enterprises .  Firms – and boards – increasingly became management-controlled 
as a result .   For the nonprofit sector, Herman and Heimovics  argue that, in 
nonprofits, organizational success and failure are likely to be attributed to the 
CEO rather than the board.13   Therefore, they argue it is appropriate for the CEO 
to take full control of the organization, although the CEO should also work to 
ensure the board fulfils its responsibilities.  More bleakly, Block  argues the 
reality of nonprofit boards is that the CEO should be ‘thankful for what [they] get 
and do the rest [themselves], alone, with staff, with consultants, or other 
volunteers’.
13 Cf. the qualitative study of Golensky (2000, 15), based on 60 interviews with 58 CEOs and 
board members, which reported that positive outcomes were attributed to the CEO, sometimes 
together with the board, but negative outcomes were seldom viewed as the responsibility of the 
CEO.
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The concept of the technostructure is related to the work of economist John 
Kenneth Galbraith.  It is discussed under the discipline of management because 
of its links with managerial hegemony theory.  The technostructure is ‘all who 
bring specialized knowledge, talent or experience to group decision-making’ in 
the large business organization .  The concept includes management, but extends 
far beyond it.  Galbraith  writes that ‘one can do worse than think of a business 
organization as a hierarchy of committees’ engaged in ‘obtaining, digesting or 
exchanging and testing information’.  However, Galbraith  cautions against 
seeking to understand the corporation as a single form, as market considerations 
predominate in smaller organizations and the requirements of the technostructure 
predominate in the larger.  
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance:  Where managerial hegemony operates, the board’s monitoring and 
judgments about organizational performance are entirely reliant on what the CEO 
chooses to disclose.  Poor results are often attributed to factors beyond the CEO’s 
control . The directors are inclined to accept any plausible explanation, because 
of behavioral norms such as treating the CEO with respect.  During normal 
times, board attempts to influence organizational performance, if any, are limited 
to asking penetrating questions.  It is only in times of crisis the CEO’s 
explanation of organization performance might be openly challenged.
Likewise, Galbraith's technostructural explanation also downplays the role of the 
board in governing the organization.  While information processing is a key 
requirement of the organization, the formal hierarchy of the large organization 
does not reflect the levels at which effective pooling of information and decision-
making occurs .  While boards engage in the solemn rites of decision-making, 
this merely conveys the impression of power .
Critiques of the theory: The main criticism of these theories is, while they might 
have descriptive power for some boards at some times, they do not accord with 
the legal reality of director responsibility for the conduct of the organization. 
These theories may be a historical vestige.  It appears that boards lacked 
influence, except in time of crisis, in the corporate sector in the 1970s and this 
might remain true in some areas of the nonprofit sector today.  However, over 
time, directors appear to be increasingly aware of their legal responsibilities and 
liabilities, and more active in their role .  Even Mintzberg , a proponent of the 
lighter form of managerial hegemony, acknowledges the possibility that boards 
might be strengthened so that managerial performance is assessed objectively. A 
further concern is that the theories offer no solution to the agency problem and 
are thus economically inefficient .   As demonstrated in section 3.1, some 
managers do engage in opportunistic – and even illegal – behavior at the expense 
of their organization.  
The empirical evidence: The empirical evidence in support of managerial 
hegemony in the for-profit sector includes the studies of Mace  and Lorsch and 
McIver , previously mentioned.  Consistent with the theory, the study of Judge 
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and Zeithaml  of board involvement in strategic decision-making processes in 
four different settings found that only 4 per cent of surveyed boards ‘both 
specified and probed management evaluations’, 27 per cent of respondents said 
their board specified the information wanted but accepted the data received, and 
nearly 70 per cent of respondents said their board accepted whatever 
management gave them.   Westphal  demonstrated that increases in the structural 
independence of boards are associated with higher levels of ingratiation and 
persuasion behaviors by CEOs toward board members.  
There is empirical evidence contrary to the theory, found in the interview based 
studies of Pettigrew and McNulty of British corporate directors (McNulty and 
Pettigrew 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty 1995; 1998).  They argue that the 
relative power of the board and CEO reflects a complex mix of context and 
structure, personal and formal sources of power, and the will and skill of 
individual directors.  Although some 90% of management recommendations on 
capital investments are endorsed, this figure masks the role of boards in 
influencing the recommendations before presentation .
Studies relevant to managerial hegemony in the nonprofit sector also reflect 
complex patterns of board-CEO power. Murray, Bradshaw and Wolpin , through 
case studies in an undisclosed number of organizations, identified five different 
patterns of board-CEO interaction.  These patterns were then studied by a survey 
of CEOs of 417 Canadian nonprofit organizations, mainly from the social 
welfare and health sectors.  The results were that 43% of respondents said they 
had a CEO-dominated board, consistent with managerial hegemony theory. 
However, the majority did not: 38% said they had a power-sharing board; 9% a 
chair-dominated board; 6% a powerless board; and 4% a fragmented power 
board.   Golensky  in her case study in four organizations identified four 
categories of contingency in board-CEO relations: the nature of communication 
between the parties; the personal attributes of the CEO; the degree of congruence 
between CEO and board in philosophy and style; and clarity, consistency and 
reciprocity of role expectations.
Cornforth  extended the Murray, Bradshaw and Woplin framework in his case 
study of CEO-board power in four organizations, of which two were quasi-
governmental and two were true nonprofits.  In one of the nonprofits, the power 
relations were characterized as a ‘dominant coalition’ of the CEO and a particular 
board member.  In one of the quasi-governmental boards, the board was seeking 
a mutually-strong partnership14 with the CEO.  Cornforth argues the degree of 
board power relative to the CEO depends on the relevant knowledge, experience 
and skills of directors, the quality of board information and systems, the 
confidence of directors, and board procedures and processes (such as agenda size 
and order).  
14 The difference between a ‘power-sharing board’ as identified by Murray, Bradshaw and Wolpin 
(1992, 168) and the ‘partnership’ as described by Cornforth (2001, 45) is in the ideological 
orientation of the boards.  The former are said to have an ideological commitment to equality and 
democracy, whereas that is not present in the latter, which wanted both the board and the CEO to 
be strong and powerful in their own domains.
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In case studies of organizational failure in the nonprofit sector, Mordaunt and 
Cornforth  demonstrate there are strong pressures for board denial of such 
failure, including limited opportunity for the board to meet without management, 
and lack of skill, time and emotional energy.  Even if problems are perceived, 
they might not be named as to do so implies accepting responsibility for their 
resolution.
We have only been able to locate one empirical study using Galbraith’s concept 
of technocracy, i.e. a historical case study of the East India Company , which 
offers partial support for Galbraith’s explanation.
Conclusion: Managerial hegemony theory and technostructure theory share the 
view that the shareholder primacy doctrine does not accord with the reality of 
large corporations.  Managerial hegemony theory appears to have a strong 
empirical base, valid in at least some organizations at some times.  It suggests 
that boards will make few attempts to influence organizational performance, 
unless some form of crisis occurs.  Nonetheless, it may well be that managerial 
hegemony and technostructure explanations have a limited life as directors 
become increasingly sophisticated in their understanding and performance of 
their responsibilities.
4.5 Summarizing the contribution of management theories
Management theories, despite their diversity, all challenge the 
shareholder/member model of the corporation.  Stewardship theory reminds that 
most managers are trustworthy, and should be supported by their boards. 
Stakeholder theory posits that the organizations have a purpose beyond serving 
shareholders/members.  Paradox theory moves beyond simplistic notions to 
embrace complexity.  Managerial hegemony theory usefully challenges many of 
the normative expectations of boards.  
The paper now moves to examine the contributions of sociology to the 
understanding of board governance.
5. Sociological theories
Sociology is the study of  'the analysis of the structure of social relationships as 
constituted by social interaction' .   In the context of board governance, sociology 
seeks to explain the institutional and social aspects of board functioning. 
Sociological theories relevant to boards include theories about institutional 
isomorphism, strategic choice, resource dependency, elites, feminism, social 
embeddedness, and Zald’s contingency theory.
5.1 Institutional isomorphism 
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Description of the theory:  Institutional isomorphic theory also goes by the name 
of neo-institutionalism.  Isomorphism is ‘a constraining process that forces one 
unit in a population to resemble other units that face the same set of 
environmental conditions’ .  While isomorphism can result from the forces of 
economic competition, it can also be a consequence of a quest for institutional 
legitimacy.  Institutional isomorphism results from domination or dependency 
(coercive isomorphism), from copying others (mimetic isomorphism), or from 
the forces of professionalization (normative isomorphism).  The key point about 
institutional isomorphism is that these forces operate as rationalized myths, 
maintaining appearances and validating an organization, regardless of the effect 
on the performance of the organization .  
Some authors speculate that boards themselves might simply result from 
institutional isomorphic forces, adding more legitimating and symbolic value 
than governing value .15  Others argue that the behavior of boards becomes 
similar as organizations replicate structures and processes of similar 
organizations in order to demonstrate their legitimacy.  Institutional pressures are 
said to influence strongly board structures and behaviors in nonprofits .  Coercive 
forces include those of the corporate law, the requirements and recommendations 
of funders, and affiliate relationships.  Mimetic forces include calls for nonprofits 
to be more business-like, in order to increase legitimacy.  Professional forces 
include the rise of a class of professional nonprofit managers, standards of 
practice and the increasing amount of governance training offered by both sector 
peak councils and independent consultants.  
DiMaggio and Powell  theorize about the conditions that foster institutional 
isomorphism.  They propose institutional isomorphic forces will be greater:
• the greater the dependence of one organization on another, including for 
resources;
• the greater the uncertainty about the relationship between ends and means; 
• the greater the ambiguity of the goals of an organization;
• the greater the reliance on academic qualification in choosing staff (and 
presumably, by logical extension, directors); and
• the greater the participation of staff (and, by extension, directors) in trade and 
professional associations.
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance: According to Meyer and Rowan , institutionalized organizations 
ceremonialize evaluation accepting ‘at face value the credentials, ambiguous 
goals, and categorical evaluations that are characteristic of ceremonial 
[institutionalized] organizations’.  The board will avoid inspection and evaluation 
within the organization.
15 Peck (2004, 195) would reply that the symbolic role is of value: ‘Boards are places where 
participants tell narratives about who they collectively are, sustain culture, organize shared 
emotions, sustain loyalty etc.’ 
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However, a different scenario might also be envisaged as being consistent with 
isomorphic theory.  The board might reflect and enact the external isomorphic 
forces in their governance of the organization.  For example, a board might 
influence the organization to pursue – or not pursue – a strategy based on the 
views of funders, what other organizations in the field are doing, or on 
perceptions of what constitutes ‘best practice’ or ‘professional standards’.
Critiques of the theory: It is arguable that institutional isomorphic theory had 
more validity when there was less economic competition.  However, as 
competitive practices are increasingly required among government-funded 
nonprofits, for example tendering for services rather than direct grants to 
nonprofits, institutional isomorphic forces might be overtaken by economic 
isomorphic forces.  Particular governance arrangements might be adopted 
because they are more economically efficient.  A second critique of isomorphic 
theory is that it might not have sufficient regard for the strategic choices 
available to organizations .  This argument is explored in the next section.
The empirical evidence: Only one empirical study has been identified which 
directly tests institutional isomorphism in the context of boards.  In a study of US 
companies, Luoma and Goodstein  demonstrated associations between 
incorporation in US states with ‘other constituency’ statutes (i.e. statutes 
allowing boards to consider interests additional to those of shareholders) and (a) 
the proportion of directors who are stakeholders, and (b) the presence of board 
committees concerned with stakeholder issues.  Likewise, heavily regulated 
industries were more likely to have such directors and committees.  
There is also one study which indirectly comments on isomorphic pressures. 
Long, Dulewicz and Gay , in a study comparing the roles played by non-
executive directors in listed and unlisted companies, conclude that the boards of 
unlisted companies are subject to less isomorphic pressure in relation to the 
issues of executive remuneration and succession planning than their counterparts 
in listed companies.
Conclusion: While there appear to be a number of factors reducing the impact of 
institutional isomorphic forces, they remain a powerful explanation for the 
existence, structure and behavior of boards.  It is readily apparent that coercive 
isomorphism operates in the form of legislative requirements to have boards and 
for boards to play certain roles.   In relation to mimetic and professional forces, it 
would be interesting to examine the effects of peak councils, technical assistance 
centers, professional bodies, and professional advisors and consultants in the 
propagation of particular forms of structure and process.  In particular, it would 
be interesting to examine the rhetorical devices that are used to promote 
particular governance solutions.16  Further, research of the efficacy of many 
popular structures and processes might show that there is no basis for the claim 
that they constitute ‘best practice’, in which case their adoption must be due to 
institutional isomorphic forces.  
16 For an example of the value of linguistic analysis of publications promoting popular 
management solutions, see Norreklit’s (2003) rhetorical analysis of the Balanced Scorecard.
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5.2 Strategic choice theory
Description of the theory:  Neoinstitutional theory assumes the environment 
shapes organizations and their behaviors.  On the other hand, strategic choice 
theory rejects this deterministic assumption – and assumptions of the 
deterministic role of technology and organizational size – and instead posits that 
organizations influence their own circumstances; indeed ‘strategic choice is the 
critical variable in a theory of organizations’ .  While not rejecting the possibility 
of environmental pressure, the theory holds that choice exists about structural 
forms, about attempts to manipulate the environment, and about desired 
performance standards.  The theory suggests that the structure and the context of 
organizations will reflect political choice and action by the organization’s 
dominant coalition.  Hence, strategic choice theory can be considered a 
contingency theory.
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance: Although the foundational work of Child  does not specifically 
address the role of boards of directors, the later work of Andrews  has done so. 
Andrews  suggests the main function of the board is ‘to review the management’s 
formulation and implementation of strategy and to exercise final authority in 
ratifying with good reason management’s adherence to established objectives and 
policy or in contributing constructively to management’s recommendations for 
change’.
Critiques of the theory: The theory does not explain why boards exist, but 
appears to take them as a given.  The implications of the theory for governance 
do not appear to be well developed.
The empirical evidence: Judge and Zeithaml  used institutional theory and 
strategic choice theory to examine board involvement in strategic decision-
making processes in four different settings. The study found support for some – 
but not all – of the propositions said to be related to strategic choice theory. 
However, in our view, the claim that these propositions are based in strategic 
choice theory is questionable.
We have not been able to locate any studies explicitly using strategic choice 
theory in the context of nonprofit governance.  However, numerous empirical 
studies in the nonprofit sector have demonstrated the value of board engagement 
in strategizing: for example Bradshaw, Murray and Wolpin , Green and 
Griesinger , and Brown (2005).
Conclusion:  Strategic choice theory is a reaction to the deterministic nature of 
some sociological theories.  It recognizes that boards and organizations can 
exercise some level of self-determination and some influence on their 
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environments.  However, the implications of the theory for governance do not 
appear to be well developed.
5.3 Resource dependency theory
Description of the theory: It has been claimed that resource dependency theory is 
the dominant theoretical approach used in the study of nonprofit governance' . 
Resource dependency theory challenges the individual and intraorganizational 
focus of most management theory and research .  It might be seen as occupying 
the middle ground between institutional isomorphism, where environment 
determines organizational form and behavior, and strategic choice, where the 
organization shapes its environment.  In resource dependency theory, 
organizations maneuver in the context of their environment, but do not reshape it. 
Resource dependency theory holds that organizational survival, although not 
necessarily problematic, nonetheless is dependent on the organization creating 
and maintaining its coalition of support.  This coalition is especially important 
for the acquisition of resources.  The degree of dependency of one organization 
on another is determined by the degree of concentration of resource control, the 
availability of substitute sources, and  whether the dependency is mutual or 
asymmetrical .  
In resource dependency theory, organizational effectiveness is the satisfaction of 
‘the demands of those in its environment from whom it requires support for its 
continued existence’ .  Effectively managing the environment requires the 
organization to maintain a balanced approach, and not be too closely nor too 
loosely connected with its environment .  
Consistent with the theory, the board’s role can be seen as reducing uncertainty 
through collecting and responding to information from the external environment, 
maintaining good public relations with these external stakeholders, and attracting 
resources to the organization  .  Resource dependency theory suggests that 
interlocking directorships, i.e. a director serving on multiple boards where the 
organizations they govern have a relationship of dependency, are a means by 
which organizations attempt to manage their environment.  
The theory highlights the issue of how an organization selects and processes 
information .  Pfeffer and Salancik  observe that information systems will reflect 
the ease of collecting, processing and presenting the particular information, 
criticality and utility of the information, and organizational structure (for 
example, organizational subunits may attempt to justify their own existence 
through the presentation of performance data).
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance: Resource dependency theory recognizes that boards might be 
internally-oriented or externally-oriented, depending on the organizational 
resource needs .  Internally-oriented boards will be involved in activities such as 
the evaluation of programs.  Externally-oriented boards are primarily concerned 
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with attracting resources from the external environment.  However, it can be 
deduced that an externally-orientated board might still be concerned with internal 
performance if this was important to those in the external environment holding 
resources.
Critiques of the theory: The application of resource dependency theory in large 
corporations has recently been the subject of trenchant criticism.  It has been 
argued that the theory had explanatory power for board interlocks and for 
mergers and acquisitions in the 1970s: at that time, these were indeed 
mechanisms by which organizations controlled their environment.  However, 
Davis  claims that from the 1980s on, the theory ‘fails to account for virtually 
anything that large corporations did’. Miller-Millisen  notes that the theory has a 
narrow emphasis on resources and ignores other environmental pressures on 
nonprofits and their boards.
The empirical evidence: Stiles and Taylor  summarize resource dependency 
studies in the for-profit sector and the results of these studies are mixed.  Much 
of the relevant empirical research in for-profits is on interlocking directorships. 
Pettigrew , having reviewed most of the extant studies and having spoken with 
several leading researchers on interlocking directorships, concludes that it is 
‘remarkably difficult to summarize the key patterns from these studies’ due to 
conflicting results and the competing interpretations using resource dependency 
theory and class hegemony theory.   He critiques this body of research as 
suffering from the ‘so what?’ problem, i.e. it is not clear what the interlocks 
really mean. Pettigrew notes the considerable variability in patterns of interlock 
between nations.  He argues the mere availability of statistical studies 
demonstrating director interlocks tells little about the purpose and consequence 
of these ties.  Davis  concludes that the interlocks identified in his study were 
more about social embeddedness than resource dependency.  His study is further 
reviewed in section 5.6.
In the nonprofit sector, the study by Zald  of branches of Chicago YMCA showed 
those branches with high status boards had higher financial contributions by 
board members to the organization, and had higher perceived organizational 
efficiency, program quality, and board strength.  However, he was not able to 
exclude the possibility of spurious correlation with executive and staff 
competence.  Pfeffer  in a study of hospital boards established that board 
composition and function were related to the ability to attract resources from the 
environment.  Provan  demonstrated in his study of nonprofit human service 
agencies that board power – as reflected by prestige, linkages, size, and 
proportion of men on the board – was a strong predictor of funding levels, but 
not of increasing funds.  He concluded board power might be important in 
resource protection, but not acquisition.  Wernet and Austin  in their qualitative 
study of nonprofit human service organizations also found support for resource 
dependency theory.  However, they also found that for most critical events in 
organizations, there was a preference for shared board-executive leadership, 
which may reflect stewardship theory.  Harlan and Saidel  used resource 
dependency theory to study the role of US nonprofits boards in influencing 
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relationships with government around contracting.  They found that the boards 
were active in the apparently contradictory roles of facilitating contracting and 
advocating on behalf of their organizations, on the one hand, as well as buffering 
the organization from government and guarding its values, on the other.  Jun and 
Armstrong  found correlations in two church congregations between positional 
power and parishioner financial contributions and service to the congregation. 
Saidel  reported that, among her sample of nonprofits in New York State, around 
40% had an advisory body in addition to its board.  In a qualitative study with a 
subset of these boards, Saidel demonstrated that the advisory boards played roles 
consistent with the theory.  More recently, Brown (2005) used resource 
dependency theory to inform his study of US nonprofits, and found that political 
and strategic competencies of boards were correlated with CEO and board 
member perceptions of organizational performance and some aspects of financial 
performance (although the findings might be also be seen as consistent with 
strategic choice theory).
Conclusion: Nonprofit organizations are often resource poor, and the work of 
many boards is dominated by questions of resource acquisition.  Resource 
dependency theory thus has ‘face’ validity: for many nonprofit organizations 
their survival depends on their ability to obtain resources and support in the 
external environment.  Many nonprofit boards and managers scan their 
environment in the search for directors who can contribute wealth, wisdom or 
work to the organization.  However, the empirical evidence in relation to 
resource dependence theory is not clear-cut, suggesting complex and subtle 
interactions between board composition and role, the external environment, and 
organizational performance.
Theories of board governance Page 35 Hough, McGregor-Lowndes & Ryan
5.4 Class hegemony theory
Description of the theory: Whereas institutional isomorphism, strategic choice 
and resource dependency theory are concerned with institutional characteristics, 
class hegemony theory is concerned with the social character of board 
functioning.  The theory, also known as the theory of elites, was a key issue in 
early scholarship on nonprofit boards.  Middleton’s 1987 review article on 
nonprofit governance, the first such review, devoted over two of its 11 pages to 
the topic.  
Class hegemony theory has an extensive history in sociology. The theory is 
simply that the upper class dominates key institutions in society, including for-
profit and nonprofit boards of directors.  Useem , a prominent elite theorist 
argues that ‘a dominant segment, consisting of the limited number of senior 
executives of the nation’s largest firms … has a common culture, informal social 
cohesion, and even some formal organization … [and] act, albeit in a highly 
imperfect fashion, as a politicized leading edge for large corporations as a bloc’.
Contributing to the internal cohesion of this corporate elite is the participation of 
its members in exclusive clubs, in industry associations and in the governance of 
nonprofits.  Especially in traditional welfare nonprofits, boards are seen to 
provide a place where business elites meet and exchange information, thus 
reinforcing class cohesion by creating common viewpoints around social, 
economic and political issues .
From a class hegemony perspective, nonprofits would have a wider role than 
mere socialization of the elite.  First, charities ameliorate some of the excesses of 
capitalism.  Second, without in any way diminishing the genuine commitment of 
some members of the elite to charitable causes and social justice, the 
involvement of the elite in charities helps promote the public image of elite 
individuals and their companies. 
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance: Class hegemony theory emphasizes the hidden role of boards 
rather than the overt and formal roles.  Generally, elite boards ensure the 
organization does not threaten the power of the elite .  It is possible that where 
boards are dominated by elites, the elite board members are vitally concerned 
about governance issues.  If there is a failure in the governance of a nonprofit 
with which they are associated, this could have implications for the individual’s 
eligibility to serve and reputation as a director of for-profits.
Critiques of the theory: Several critiques can be made of class hegemony theory. 
First, elite domination has declined over time due to the greater demand for 
board members with the growth in the number of nonprofits, increasing support 
from government (and thus declining dependence on donations), and the 
professionalization of nonprofit managers .  Second, while there are some 
examples of elite domination of nonprofits, this does not hold for all and 
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especially not for the smaller, less prestigious organizations .  Third, class 
hegemony theory might be considered reductionist in that it assumes the upper 
class to be one coherent entity with common interests.  However, there are many 
examples of members of the upper class with a strong pre-existing commitment 
to social justice.  Finally, class hegemonic theory assumes the nonprofit to be 
coopted by the elite directors, and ignores the possibility of the reverse process .
The empirical evidence: Middleton  identifies a number of empirical studies of 
nonprofits, now somewhat dated, which demonstrated that community elites 
serve on nonprofit boards.  Abzug , in her historical-comparative study of 
nonprofit board composition in six US cities from 1931 to 1991, reports a decline 
in the number of elite trustees, albeit a relatively slow decline.  In a study of 
board interlocks across major US nonprofit, corporate and government 
institutions, Moore et al.  reported dense linkages between business, government, 
and policy-planning groups, but found that national charities and foundations had 
significantly lower levels of interlocks.
Conclusion:  Class hegemony theory was once a popular explanation of the role 
played by nonprofit boards.  However, over time, the amount of scholarship 
using this framework has considerably reduced.  We speculate that there have 
been two factors at work.  First, we suggest there has been a decline in support 
for explicitly left-wing ideology in academia.  Second, the rapid increase in the 
number of nonprofit organizations seen in many countries, together with the rise 
of the commitment to consumer participation, has opened board participation to a 
wider group.   Although still maintaining descriptive power for some nonprofits 
(for example, some foundations and older charities), the theory of class 
hegemony has diminishing applicability over time.   
5.5 Feminist theory
Description of the theory: It is difficult to define what constitutes feminist theory, 
with one author claiming that ‘resistance to defining feminism is in fact so 
widespread as to appear to be the dominant feminist theoretical position’ . 
Writing from a radical perspective, hooks17   defines feminism as ‘a struggle to 
end sexist oppression’ including ‘a struggle to eradicate the ideology of 
domination that permeates Western culture on various levels as well as a 
commitment to reorganizing society so that the self-development of people can 
take precedence over imperialism, economic expansion, and material desires’. 
Feminist theorizing is diverse, including liberal, Marxist, socialist, radical, post-
modern and anarchist perspectives.    According to Machold , modern feminist 
theory might be grouped into two schools.  First, sexual difference theorists focus 
on women’s experience and voices, and ‘an affirmation of the feminine’ . 
Second, gender theorists focus more on gender than biological differences and 
argue against inequality.  Feminist organization theory highlights issues such as 
patriarchy, power and hierarchy . 
17 hooks does not use capitals in her name.
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Feminist legal scholars have been active in raising issues in corporate law .  They 
have asked ‘the woman question’, i.e. where are women and what are their 
experiences; asked practical questions about the utility of law from women’s 
perspectives; and challenged the dichotomy between public and private lives in 
governance matters .  Further, feminist scholars have challenged shareholder 
primacy, critiqued the limited operation of the fiduciary duty of care, and 
critiqued the concentration of corporate power .  
Writing from a management perspective, Machold  suggests that existing 
discourse on corporate governance – including agency theory and stakeholder 
theory – are largely framed in masculinist terms, with an emphasis on questions 
such as power and conflicts of interest.  She proposes what she calls a ‘feminist 
governance model’, where the organization is seen as a web of relationships 
rather than as agency theory’s nexus of contracts.  Within this web there is an 
ethical obligation to care, which is embedded in the organization’s systems and 
procedures.  As opposed to broad stakeholder theory, Machold suggests that the 
duty to care is to those individuals with whom the board is in a close relationship. 
Writing specifically in the context of the nonprofit sector, Odendahl and 
Youmans (1984, 208) argue that the nonprofit system is “gendered female”, with 
strong gender roles operating in elite charity boards.  In these boards, male 
father-figures perform the role of decision making and female mother-figures 
take on the role of caregiving.  However, they acknowledge that nonprofits and 
their boards are in a process of transition, with greater involvement of women, 
including minority women.
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance:  Iannello (1992, 45) asserts that within organizations based on 
feminist principles of empowerment, ‘members monitor themselves’.  In 
Machold’s feminist governance model, board influence would be consistent with 
feminist values around caring .
Critiques of the theory: From our brief introduction to the debates about the 
definition and content of feminist thought, it is clear that there is no one single 
theory, but rather a collection of relatively diverse perspectives bound together 
by a concern for women and the roles played by women.
The empirical evidence: Empirical studies informed by feminism have been 
dominated by research on gender counts and organizational form.  In relation to 
gender counts, Burke  reviews these in for-profits and Odendahl and Youmans 
do the same for the nonprofit sector.  The latter authors conclude that female 
directors of nonprofits are less likely than their male counterparts to be engaged 
in policy-making, and more likely to be involved in organizations that are 
community-based and in organizations with smaller budgets.  
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There is a small but significant body of work on organizational form.  There has 
been some academic interest in feminist collectives in particular, with Iannello 
(1992), highlighting the need to recognize ability or expertise within collectives, 
for strategies to maximize empowerment, and for strong goal clarity within these 
groups.  Grant , in her analysis of 17 British women’s nonprofits, found 
increasing convergence within women’s organizations,  as a result of move away 
from bureaucracy and hierarchy in traditional women’s organizations and a move 
to greater structure in the women’s movement organizations.  She notes that few 
pure collectives continue, with most collectives having transformed into hybrid 
organizations involving creative combinations of structure and participation.  A 
similar trend towards hybrid organization is noted by Bordt  in her study of 
women’s organizations in New York City.   
An exception to the counts- and organizational form- studies is that of Bradshaw, 
Murray and Wolpin (1996).  In a study looking at the difference female-
dominated boards made among  276 Canadian nonprofits, the authors found few 
differences between boards with a high percentage of women, and those with a 
low percentage, in board and organizational effectiveness, structure, process and 
organizational characteristics.
Conclusion: There is no single feminist theory, but rather a coincidence of 
interest in issues relevant to women, as well as broader issues in relation to 
oppression, power and hierarchy.  Feminist theory usefully highlights issues of 
whose voice is heard, whose is not, and with what consequence.  It also brings 
into focus questions of power.  Empirical work on governance informed by 
feminist theory has, so far, been dominated by studies of gender counts and 
organizational form.
5.6 Social embeddedness theory
Description of the theory:  ‘Embeddedness’ or ‘social embeddedness’ refers to 
the argument that behavior and institutions must be understood as being 
constrained by ongoing social relations .  It rejects positivist economic views of 
organizations – such as agency theory and TCE – as undersocialized, for they 
‘disallow by hypothesis any impact of social structure and social relations’ . 
Embeddedness theory also rejects over socialized theories, which see behavior as 
automatically determined by the these elements.  Instead, embeddedness theory 
treads the middle ground, seeing culture as an on-going process.
In terms of organizational behavior, embeddedness theory stresses ‘the role of 
personal relations and structures (or “networks”) of such relations in generating 
trust and discouraging malfeasance’ , such as self-serving behavior in the agency 
problem.  However, Granovetter  acknowledges that personal relations and 
structures are not the complete answer as networks vary and, while social 
relations may be necessary for trust, they are not a guarantee of trustworthy 
behavior.  
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The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance:  Embeddedness theory suggests that, for directors, social 
relationships can prevail over fiduciary concerns or technical expertise.  Indeed, 
it might even be seen as ‘the major factor limiting their effectiveness’ .  Director 
interlocks create a network of social obligation, and those social obligations can 
impede board monitoring, distort the basis of judgment, and negatively impact on 
the influence of directors.  Alternatively, the social relationships can also work 
positively as ‘directors are more likely to respond to concerns about honor, 
obligations, and notions of appropriateness’ .  As Granovetter  suggested, albeit 
in a broader context, embeddedness theory makes no sweeping predictions.
The empirical evidence: Davis  notes evidence of ‘an interlocking directorate 
linking virtually all large American firms into a single network based on shared 
board members’.  After careful analysis of these interlocks, he suggests that, with 
rare exceptions, the pattern of interlocks is not consistent with resource 
dependency theory and is better explained as reflecting social embeddedness. 
The interlocks are sources of information and legitimation for CEOs and boards.
We have not been able to identify studies examining embeddedness in the study 
of nonprofit governance.
Conclusion: Embeddedness theory treads the middle-ground between under- and 
over-socialized conceptions of organizations.  It avoids making sweeping 
generalizations, and instead suggests that organizational behavior must be 
understood in the context of the particular social structures and social relations of 
an organization.  Embeddedness issues are relevant to the agency problem and 
agency theory, and are part of the explanation for managerial hegemony. 
Contradictorily, they can also be relevant to managerial stewardship.    
5.7 Zald’s contingency theory
Description of the theory: Zald  rejects both managerial hegemony and class 
hegemony theories, arguing for a contingency theory of the power and functions 
of boards.  He argues board power is a function of bases of power, personal 
characteristics and organizational characteristics.  For example, board members 
are more powerful when:
• they control or represent important external resources to the organization, 
such as major blocs of shares or external groups important to organizational 
success;
• board members are high in prestige and status; and
• the organization is in crisis or making major decisions.
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance:  Zald  explicitly addresses the question of the board’s knowledge of 
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the organization, arguing that it is essential for director input to and impact on 
decision making.
Zald  argues that conditions of organizational complexity, and in particular size 
and technology, impact on board understanding and influence.  In general, the 
smaller the organization and the simpler the technology, the easier it is for the 
board to understand the organization.  The larger the organization and the more 
complex the technology, the more the board is dependent on the CEO for 
information.  However, Zald  also suggests adaptive responses by boards, 
including delegation to expert subcommittees, and the recruitment of directors 
with specialist knowledge.
Critiques of the theory: Proponents of paradox theory suggest that contingency 
theory merely reframes problems as ‘either/or’ rather than being based on more 
organic understandings of organizations .
The empirical evidence: Murray, Bradshaw and Wolpin  in their study of 
Canadian nonprofit boards tested some, but not all, aspects of Zald’s theory.  The 
evidence did support one association predicted by Zald (between board-power 
profiles and the maintenance of a wide range of external contacts), but did not 
find other associations he predicted (percentage of women on the board, 
prestigious board members and the age of the organization).
Conclusion: Despite the lack of validation, Zald’s contingency theory is useful in 
highlighting how organizational complexity might impact on the power and 
functions of the board of directors.  It presents a relatively comprehensive set of 
explanations for the power and functions of boards.  In particular, it suggests 
organizational size and technology will impact upon board understanding of and 
influence on organizational performance.
5.8 Summarizing the contribution of sociological theories
Sociology contributes to our understanding of the institutional and social forces 
in operation in board governance.  Institution-based theories are isomorphism, 
strategic choice, and resource dependence theories.  Institutional isomorphism 
suggests that organizations in the same field are likely to look alike; strategic 
choice theory stresses organizational discretion and strategizing; and resource 
dependency theory might be seen as occupying the middle ground.  Theories 
which are more socially-based are feminist theory and social embeddedness 
theory.  Feminist theory addresses issues of oppression and power, especially 
power for women.  Social embeddedness theory contends that individual 
behaviors must be understood in the context of social relations.  Zald’s 
contingency theory includes both institutional and social factors.
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6. Psychological perspectives
Psychology is concerned with ’the science of mind’ or ‘the science of behavior' . 
There are surprisingly, and regrettably, few studies on governance by authors 
whose primary discipline is psychology.  So far, psychology has mainly offered 
insights the issues of small group effectiveness, and the core psychological 
processes underpinning board functioning.
6.1 Small group effectiveness theories
Description of the theory: Psychology has long been concerned with the question 
of effective group functioning, and governance researchers can learn from these 
studies .  Forbes and Milliken  argue the very existence of boards ‘is rooted in the 
wise belief that the effective oversight of an organization exceeds the capabilities 
of any individual and that collective knowledge and deliberation are better suited 
to this task’ .  They argue that board effectiveness is likely to be heavily 
dependent on social-psychological processes.  They theorize that board task 
performance will be positively associated with group effort norms, cognitive 
conflict, and the knowledge and skills of board members, but board cohesiveness 
will be negatively associated with cognitive conflict.  Bainbridge  argues that 
groups are superior in governance roles because the group usually has the benefit 
of the views of its best decisionmaker, can avoid individual decision-making 
biases, and can help constrain individual shirking due to group norms. 
Bainbridge does acknowledge, however, that group norms can work either way 
and group decisionmaking can result in social loafing.  Nonetheless, Bainbridge 
argues corporations benefit from group decisionmaking at the top of their 
hierarchies.
Drawing on a lifetime of research into group effectiveness, Zander  argues that, 
in a strong board, the board is interactive rather than passive, directors depend on 
each other to achieve common goals, personal involvement is satisfying, and the 
board has genuine influence on those who the board is expected to monitor and 
guide.  In a short but useful article, Cascio  highlights the application of general 
issues in group and team effectiveness to the specific work of boards, including 
the behavior of group leaders, selection of group members, and performance 
assessment and feedback. 
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance:  Understanding of organizational performance will be enhanced by 
identifying and sharing relevant facts .  Board influence on organizational 
performance will increase by the board presenting clear information, arousing the 
interest of those responsible for change, making action easier by providing 
practical steps to follow, engaging support within the organization, and enacting 
reinforcing strategies .
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Critiques of the theory: Reviewing the evidence on selected aspects of the 
decisionmaking behavior of small task groups, Davis  cautions against accepting 
‘compelling intuitions’ such as the superiority of group performance in 
decisionmaking.  He notes the existence of a number of under-researched areas, 
including decisionmaking by ‘long-term groups of experts dedicated to 
protracted periods of work, punctuated by rest or alternative effort’ – which 
might be an apt description of boards.  Other than Bainbridge’s analytical article, 
there appear to be no other articles which have applied Davis’ work to governing 
boards.
The empirical evidence: Zander and Newcomb  in a study of 149 United Way 
funds demonstrated that, ironically, ‘unreasonably difficult goals are more often 
chosen when performance … is deficient’.  The subsequent study by Zander, 
Forward and Albert  examined 23 boards that met their fundraising targets four 
years in a row with 23 boards that did not do so each year for the same period. 
Unsuccessful boards repeatedly set their goals too high, or sought to eliminate 
goals, and gave lower ratings to their boards as a whole.  Chait, Taylor and 
Holland  in their qualitative study of governing boards in higher education 
reported the effective boards had set goals for themselves.  
The empirical evidence in relation to appropriate group size for group decision-
making has been assessed to be incomplete, inadequate and inconclusive .  In 
relation to board size, the evidence is mixed: Cornforth  in his study of UK 
charities found no relationship between board size and board effectiveness.  On 
the other hand, Golden and Zajac  in their study of US hospital boards found a 
curvilinear relationship, with a positive association for boards under 30 persons 
between increasing board size and organizational strategic change, and a negative 
relationship for boards above this size. 
Brown’s study, previously discussed, uses decision and group process theory to 
inform his study of US nonprofits, finding that the analytic, educational and 
interpersonal competencies of boards are correlated with CEO and board member 
perceptions of organizational performance and with some indicators of financial 
performance (Brown 2005).
Conclusion: This review of the literature on small group effectiveness, albeit 
limited in scope, demonstrates that psychology can provide rich insights into the 
work of governing boards.  However, research into boards as small groups has so 
far been limited, despite this potential.  There is a clear need for further 
investigations of board governance by those with a sound training in psychology.
6.2 Psychoanalytic theory
Description of the theory: The psychoanalytic approach rejects the view of 
organizations as rational entities.  As Manfred Kets de Vries  writes ‘what really 
goes on in organizations takes place in the intrapsychic and interpersonal world 
of the key players, below the surface of day-to-day behaviors’  Further, he argues 
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that ‘Scholars of management need to recognize that organizations as systems 
have their own life – a life that is not only conscious but also unconscious, not 
only rational but also irrational .
Kets de Vries  suggests three basic processes in groups: dependency, fight-flight 
responses, and pairing.  In dependency, the group looks for strong, charismatic 
leadership.  In fight-flight responses, the group functions on the basis of attack or 
avoidance; ‘taking personal responsibility for problems is unheard of; instead, 
blame is routinely (and vindictively) assigned elsewhere’ .  In pairing, people 
pair up with an individual or group perceived as powerful, but this ironically 
results in splitting in the wider system.  Kets de Vries suggests that there are five 
types of neurotic organizations: the dramatic organization is characterized by 
emotion, boldness, and flamboyance; the suspicious organization is typified by 
distrust and paranoia; the compulsive is dominated by rules and procedures; 
detached organizations are cold and emotionally austere; and depressive 
organizations are associated with inactivity and conservatism.  He calls for 
organizations that embody authenticity in their actions. 
Dartington  has applied psychoanalytic theory to nonprofits, including the role of 
nonprofit boards.  Analyzing the experiences of those appointed to new positions 
of CEOs in small organizations, he writes ‘It is as if being elected to a committee 
puts the individual in touch with omnipotent fantasies of the tyrannical infant’ . 
Gibelman  confirms that first CEOs often have difficulty with their boards.
Critiques of the theory: No published critiques of psychoanalytic explanations of 
organizational behavior have been located.  
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance: The psychoanalytic approach de-emphasizes the rational aspects of 
monitoring, judging and influencing organizational performance, and instead 
would locate processes such as these in the wider psychodynamics of the 
organization.  For example, when an organization first appoints a CEO, 
organizational performance might not be judged based on objective factors. 
After an initial honeymoon period, directors experience loss of psychological 
ownership of the organization and judge the CEO on that subjective basis. 
Dartington  suggests organizations must resolve their ‘Oedipal struggles’ at key 
stages of their growth in order to function effectively.  
The empirical evidence: By its nature, the psychoanalytic approach does not lend 
itself to statistical data-gathering, but requires case studies of individuals and 
organizations across time .  
Mace’s early work on governance highlighted the psychological dynamics of 
family firms, arguing that such companies family members ‘bring into the 
business conflicts, rivalries, guilt feelings, ambitions, loyalties, prides, 
resentments, and interrelationships which are quite different from the 
characteristics of typical nonfamily companies’ .
Theories of board governance Page 44 Hough, McGregor-Lowndes & Ryan
In an in-depth case study in one nonprofit organization, Golden-Biddle and Rao 
note the organization’s hybrid identities of a ‘volunteer-driven organization’ and 
a ‘family of friends’.   Dartington’s work, previously mentioned, includes useful 
case studies of psychodynamic processes at work in two nonprofit organizations . 
Conclusion: Psychoanalytic theories offer potentially profound insight into the 
work of governing boards, especially in small nonprofits.  We offer three 
insights.  First, as noted by Golden-Biddle and Rao, many small nonprofits have 
a strong family feel to their operations, and this might well result in the typical 
dynamics of family-based firms discussed by Mace.  Second, in some nonprofits, 
there are limited forces containing behavior, for example directors lack the 
socializing experiences of directors of listed corporations.  Thus, basic 
psychological processes might operate more fully.  Third, in health and disability 
organizations, some behaviors might be explained by the processes of clients, 
and affected staff and directors, acting out their emotional responses in relation to 
their health or disability.
7. Political theories
Description of the theory: Politics is the ‘practice of the art or science of 
directing and administrating … political units’ , with organizations being 
conceived as political units. 
Unlike agency theory and TCE which seek to understand board governance in 
the context of production and assume that the interests of individual players are 
subordinate to the economic goals of the organization, political theory18 gives 
more emphasis to social context and acknowledge the distribution of power and 
politics to be fundamental to the work of boards. 19  Two political perspectives are 
explored here: interest group theory, and the normative promotion of democracy.
The interest group theory of political decisionmaking has ‘modest analytic 
pretensions but rather impressive generality as a framework for observation’ .  It 
assumes that all organizations consist of interest groups which make demands on 
the organization.  In order for decisions to be made on resource allocation, 
brokers attempt to form coalitions among the interest groups.  
The theory ordinarily highlights ‘bargaining, compromise, negotiation, 
inconsistency, and more or less continual conflict’ and ‘power, internal struggle, 
and expediency’ ..  With the advent of computers, mathematical modeling of 
interest group theory became possible, for greater analytical precision .  
18 So do team production theory, stakeholder theory, paradox theory, managerial hegemony 
theory, strategic choice theory, resource dependency theory, and the theory of elites.
19 This is a much wider conception of politics than the ‘political model’ identified by Turnbull 
(1997, 191-193).  Turnbull is concerned with the more limited question of how governments 
favour particular corporate constituencies.  For that reason, Turnbull’s ‘political model’ is not 
developed here.
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In the political framework, the board might be conceived as being positioned 
between the organization’s external coalition (for example owners, suppliers, 
unions, interest groups, and government) and the internal coalition (for example 
the CEO, managers, staff and organizational ideology) .  The external coalition 
may be dominating, divided, or passive, depending on organizational 
circumstances .  Where the external coalition is dominating, the board is a control 
device; however, in reality the dominant forces will probably bypass the board 
and access management directly.  If the external coalition is divided, the board 
will be a symbolic ‘battleground for control’, despite the fact that boards have 
limited influence.  Finally, if the external coalition is passive, management will 
control the organization unhindered and use the board to provide service to 
management or as a façade.  The question of the relative power of the board has 
already been discussed in section 4.4 when discussing managerial hegemony 
theory.
Of course, the degree to which the political perspective holds true might be 
contingent on the circumstances of the particular organization.  Based on their 
conversations with board members of independent and public education 
institutions, Chait, Taylor and Holland  believe the board members of the latter 
‘often view themselves as public watchdogs, constituency representatives, or 
emissaries of partisan political interests’.
Some authors promote democracy in governance.  Mintzberg  argues for 
democratization of for-profit enterprises by worker and/or public interest group 
representation on boards.  Democratic values influence many nonprofit 
organizations.  Cornforth  argues that, in a democratic framework, the board’s 
role is to represent its constituencies and to resolve differences in preferences of 
those constituencies.  Reiser  argues that, although democratic membership-based 
organizations are not essential for efficiency and accountability, democracy can 
assist achieving these, promote the reputation and legitimacy of the organization, 
and advance the cause of civil society.
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance:  A political perspective suggests that board monitoring, judging 
and influencing of organizational performance is an inherently political process, 
reflecting the distribution of power within the organization at the relevant time. 
As suggested by Leat , such understanding and influence will be subject to 
contest.  Despite challenging rational assumptions about the role of boards, Leat 
sees value in some rational approaches such as negotiated roles.  Turnbull  points 
out that for action to be taken, the organizational actors need information ‘which 
is accurate, timely, sufficient and yet manageable’.  
Critiques of the theory: Political perspectives of corporate governance are more a 
perspective for understanding boards, than a coherent theory.  Another 
consideration is that boards with a predominantly political mode of operation 
might not be able to survive, as the constant contest would take its toll on board 
effectiveness .  
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In relation to the argument for democratic governance, it has been argued that 
representative structures in corporate governance will impair the quality of 
decision making .  Democracy in for-profit institutions has been described as ‘an 
impractical ideal’ .  Democracy in nonprofits can result in the election of 
directors on the basis of ‘popularity and likeability’, not skill .
The empirical evidence: In one of the earliest empirical studies on boards, Price 
identified that the roles of directors of regulatory bodies were predominantly 
political, rather than supervisory or economic.  Chait, Taylor and Holland  in 
their qualitative study of boards of nonprofit higher education institutions 
identified political competencies as among the core competencies of the board. 
However, the quantitative study by Jackson and Holland,  using the Board Self-
Assessment Questionnaire, found only a very weak correlation between degree 
of board competency on the political dimension and one indicator of 
organizational performance, namely performance on a composite financial 
indicator.  
Conclusion: Thinking about boards from a political perspective highlights two 
phenomena.  First, there is the question of how boards respond to the conflicting 
interests of stakeholders in the environment.  Here, there are obvious links with 
the descriptive and instrumental versions of stakeholder theory.  Second, there is 
the question of how boards respond to their internal conflicts and jockeying for 
power.  Of course, the internal and external phenomena are sometimes related.
8. History
History is concerned with that ‘branch of knowledge which deals with past 
events, as recorded in writings or otherwise ascertained; the formal record of the 
past, esp. of human affairs or actions; the study of the formation and growth of 
communities and nations’ (Oxford English Dictionary Online).  In the context of 
governance, it addresses the question of how the current forms and practices of 
governance have come to be and come to be sustained or changed.  
Historical accounts tend to be theory-free.  However, path dependency theory is 
based in the history of the development of governance mechanisms.  Ironically, 
most of the writing on path dependency explanations of corporate governance 
has been by legal scholars, rather than historians.  Thus most of the relevant 
literature has a comparative law perspective and methodology.  Nonetheless, it is 
essentially a theory of historical development, and hence has been placed in this 
section.
Path dependency theory
Description of the theory: Generally, path dependency ‘refers to how a unique 
beginning can trigger a sequence of events and create a deterministic path that is 
followed in the chain of subsequent events’ .  However, Bebchuk and Roes’ 
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foundational work on path dependency in corporate governance is not necessarily 
deterministic.  They argue that regimes of governance depend on past 
arrangements, but only in part.  While arrangements for governance may change, 
they change in the context of, and in reaction to, the arrangements in existence at 
the time of change.   Bebchuk and Roe use path dependency theory to explain 
why governance structures differ among the advanced economies of the world, 
despite forces for convergence.   
Three reasons have been suggested for path dependence.  First, there is structure-
driven path dependence resulting from factors including sunk costs and the 
creation of power-bases.  Second, there is rule-driven dependence.  For reasons 
of efficiency, initial rules reflect the initial corporate governance arrangements 
which are then sustained because of interest group politics   A third reason for 
path dependency is the psychology specific to national cultures, described as ‘the 
mother of all path dependencies’ .
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance:  Path dependence theory has not addressed these issues.  However, 
it can be anticipated that relevant processes and practices will in part reflect the 
path of their development.
Critiques of the theory:  It has been argued that path-dependence is overstated for 
some for-profit types.  While formal governance arrangements may be slow to 
change, it might well be that there is more convergence at the functional level . 
For example, in for profits, poor financial performance will have consequences 
for the tenure of senior management , regardless of whether the corporate 
governance system is shareholder-based, conglomerate-based  or banker-based, 
and regardless of whether there is unitary governance or a two-tiered  system of 
executive board and supervisory board.
Other authors go further, arguing that instead of path dependence, there is in fact 
substantial convergence of corporate governance systems across nations as a 
result of competitive advantages of the shareholder-focused system of corporate 
governance .  This is said to result from the forces of logic, example and 
competition.  Convergency theory, in turn, has been challenged as ignoring real 
national differences . 
The empirical evidence: Most of the empirical evidence in relation to path 
dependency, or its competitor, convergence, has been based in historical 
comparisons of the law or cross-jurisdiction comparisons of the law .   In much 
legal scholarship, there is limited gathering of new empirical evidence and 
instead more analysis, speculation of theoretical relationships, and synthesis.
We have not been able to identify any articles taking a transnational approach to 
the analysis of nonprofit law using a path dependency perspective.  However, it 
might be speculated that path dependency will be more pronounced in relation to 
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nonprofit corporate forms, due to the absence of competitive forces in existence 
in the for-profit sector.
Conclusion: Path dependency theory suggests governance arrangements 
developed at a point in time guide subsequent actions, even if only serving as a 
reference point for future change.  It is, potentially, a powerful explanation of the 
forms of nonprofit governance.  A potential line of research would be to study the 
relationship between institutional isomorphic pressures and path dependency. 
For example, it would be interesting to compare the development of the 
governance arrangements of organizations in the same field, but founded at 
different points of time and with different starting arrangements, as a way of 
exploring whether institutional isomorphic pressures at the field level compete or 
co-exist with path dependency pressures at the level of the organization.
9. Theological perspectives
Religious organizations play an important role in the nonprofit sectors of many 
nations.  In order to understand the functioning of these organizations, it is 
essential to understand the theology of their members .  Ontology and theology 
are linked.
Theology is ‘Reflection on the nature and being of God’  or ‘The study or science 
which treats of God, His nature and attributes, and His relations with man and the 
universe; ‘the science of things divine’ (Hooker); divinity’ (Oxford English 
Dictionary Online).  With governance, theology is concerned with the question of 
how to practice governance consistent with one’s faith.  In this section, we 
explore Christian stewardship theory, although we acknowledge that it might best 
be described as a an understanding or approach rather than a theory.  Regrettably, 
the paper does not extend to perspectives on governance in other faiths.  
In passing, it is noted that there are links between theology and general laws of 
governance.  The concept of fiduciary responsibility was developed in the 
context of testamentary law by the ecclesiastical courts.  The notion of ‘fiduciary’ 
might be considered a secular version of the Christian concept of ‘steward’. 
Christian stewardship
Description of the understanding: According to Hester  ‘practicing governance in 
a religious institution is a calling, an expression of the human vocation to live 
faithfully in the image of God, to serve God by responding with care in the 
matters of daily living to God’s universal love for all creation’.  The governance 
arrangements of religious groups vary widely.  For example, the Catholic Church 
regards the power of governance as belonging to the Church ‘by divine 
institution’, with those in sacred orders being capable of power with the 
cooperation of lay people .  At the other extreme is the anti-clerical 
congregational polity of some protestant denominations.
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It is common for Christian organizations to talk about governance in the context 
of stewardship .  The definition of steward includes ‘servant of God’ (Oxford 
English Dictionary Online).  Analyzing Luke 12:13-48 and 16:1-9 and Matthew 
25:14-30, Jeavons  suggests that, at a descriptive level, the steward always serves 
something or someone greater than him or herself, the steward’s interests extend 
beyond financial matters, good stewardship cannot be assumed, and the steward’s 
role is proactive ‘in cultivating resources for moral purposes’.  At a normative 
level, it is suggested these passages reinforce the obligation of trust of governing 
boards, emphasize that stewardship requires a profound commitment, and state 
the role of the steward is to take ‘material things, that may have no inherent 
value, and give them lasting worth by seeing that they are administered to serve a 
moral purpose’ .  
In religious-based community services, boards face ‘the challenge of articulating 
institutional purposes and values in light of their sacred nature’  and keeping the 
institution faithful .  The organization’s mission and values should be derived 
from the organization’s theological understandings, and should inform all aspects 
of the governance and management of the organization .
The role of the board in monitoring, judging and influencing organizational  
performance: Hester  argues governance should be regarded as a process of 
interpretation of mission and values, rather than one of problem-solving.  During 
the process of interpretation, the board draws on both theological and practical 
understandings.  Butler  argues that monitoring information must be mission-
relevant. 
Where mistakes are made, directors can have regard to their theological beliefs 
regarding forgiveness and reconciliation .
Critiques of the understanding: Theological understandings, by their nature, are 
arguably neither right nor wrong.  They simply reflect faith.
The empirical evidence: Hester  reports on his work with Holland surveying 
sixteen theological schools.  He concludes that, empirically, the institution’s 
theological beliefs play ‘a very modest role, if any at all, in the practice of 
trusteeship’.  No other studies on board monitoring, judging and influence from a 
theological perspective have been identified.
Conclusion: Christian stewardship understandings on governance are clearly 
intended to be normative.  They offer a unique – and, in some ways, radical 
-understanding of the task of governance.  Theological understandings of 
governance will undoubtedly vary according to adherents’ meta-frameworks of 
theology, and are likely to reflect the institutional framework of the relevant 
religious denomination.  Inevitably, the governing boards of religious 
organizations need to refer to practical considerations, as well as theological 
ones.  
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10.Implications for research
From the review of the theories of board governance, it is clear that if research on 
the governance of nonprofit organizations is to be complete in scope, rich in 
content, and relevant, multi-disciplinary and multi-theory perspectives are 
needed.  This review has demonstrated that there are numerous issues, beyond 
the agency problem, to be explored.  It has also been shown that there are 
substantial overlaps between the theories.  Thus, a single discipline is unlikely to 
provide all relevant theoretical insights into any given research problem.  For 
example, questions of power are often important in research on board 
governance, and thus insights from political theory will be relevant.  To give 
another example, it is clearly the case that both agency theory and stewardship 
theory have their place.   Researchers could investigate the ‘switching rules’ in 
order to examine the paradox of how to assurance conformance without being 
overly controlling.
We concur with other researchers who argue that research on board governance 
must move beyond simple reliance on agency theory and economics, while not 
rejecting the insights they might offer .  As Lynall, Golden and Hillman 
succinctly state, ‘it is not a question of if existing theories are helpful to our 
understanding of boards and [organizational] performance but, rather, a question 
of when each is helpful’.
To advance scholarship in nonprofit governance, researchers might consider the 
following suggestions.  First, nonprofit scholars must continue to investigate a 
range of issues, not just issues related to the agency problem. The analysis of the 
theoretical literatures has highlighted many other areas for investigation.  
Second, where practical and appropriate, researchers should use a multi-theory 
approach .  It is encouraging to observe that attempts to use a multi-theory 
approach have recently emerged in the literature on nonprofit governance, (see 
for example, Brown (2005) and Miller-Millesen (2003)).   For any given issue in 
nonprofit governance under investigation, there is likely to be more than one 
relevant perspective and theory.  
Third, as discussed in section 6, there is a clear need for further investigations of 
board governance by academics with a strong training in psychology.  The 
literature is increasingly moving into psychological issues such as trust , 
interpersonal power, and group cognition, and yet much of this writing has been 
by academics who have no or very limited training in psychology.  There are 
obvious dangers in this regard.  Also, psychologists could usefully expand 
existing research in relation to teamwork and small group effectiveness, explore 
issues in relation to belongingness , conflict, and the impact of differences in 
national cultures .  These are fundamental issues in psychology. 
Fourth, where possible, there is value in having research teams composed of 
people of differing disciplines.  This will help overcome the problem of lack of 
Theories of board governance Page 51 Hough, McGregor-Lowndes & Ryan
awareness of the contributions that different disciplines can make and help 
challenge any blind-spots of particular disciplines.
Finally, we note that taking a more theoretical approach does not require the use 
of higher-level theory in all cases.  As Llewelyn  convincingly argues, simply 
generating metaphor, identifying dualisms, and creating concepts are all forms of 
theorizing.  Board process studies  are interesting examples of the valuable 
contribution that mid-level theorizing can make.
11.Implications for public policy
Agency theory considerations have dominated regulatory thinking about 
governance.  Certainly, agency theory has some place in regulatory designs as the 
numerous cases of scandals in both the for-profit and nonprofit sectors 
demonstrate.  Yet the range of relevant theory and empirical research suggest that 
the singular emphasis on the agency problem has been misplaced.   There are a 
range of ‘problems’ to be solved in corporate governance in addition to the 
agency problem.  
We would argue that starting discussions about governance with the question of 
the purpose of the board is to begin the discussion with the wrong question.   The 
beginning question in public policy should be how regulators can foster 
performance and conformance in diverse organizations.  Regulatory schemes 
should allow the variable apportionment of corporate governance responsibilities 
and liabilities having regard to the internal and external environments of 
organizations.
A first consideration should be matching governance requirements with 
organizational powers.  An organization with limited powers might have few 
regulatory requirements imposed on it.  On the other hand, those organizations 
which intend to implement substantial programs, seek substantial donations from 
non-members, acquire substantial assets, or borrow large sums from their banks 
might be subjected to extensive requirements.  
A second consideration is that, while every organization should have appropriate 
mechanisms and structures for ensuring organizational accountability, it is not 
necessarily the case that any one responsibility must lie with the board.  As long 
as someone in the organization has the responsibility and accountability, it might 
matter little if it is management or the board which discharges the responsibility . 
It should be remembered that in many nations there has been the rise of a 
generation of skilled nonprofit CEOs, which raises legitimate questions about 
whether some responsibilities might more appropriately rest with the CEO rather 
than the part-time amateur boards . 
A third consideration is that boards are just one possible element in the design of 
an appropriate corporate governance regime.  Organizations could be allowed 
flexibility in designing corporate governance regimes.  In the case of smaller 
organizations, such regimes might or might not include a board of directors.  The 
one-size-fits-all requirement to have a board of directors should be reconsidered. 
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It is ironic that the smallest incorporated nonprofit is subject to the same 
requirement to have a board of directors as the largest and richest organization. 
While the appropriateness of larger organizations having boards is not 
questioned, there might be greater flexibility about their role.  
Corporate governance arrangements – other than boards – that could assist 
organizations achieve high levels of accountability might include increased legal 
requirements on CEOs, general meetings of members, requirements in relation to 
reporting to stakeholders or regulators, and requirements for independent audits 
of key aspects of the organization beyond the traditional financial audit.
In summary, the current emphasis on the agency problem in regulatory regimes 
ignores other important issues in the design of corporate governance 
arrangements.  Given the lack of an incontrovertible explanation for the existence 
and function of boards, there is a strong case for more flexible corporate 
governance designs.
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12.Conclusion
This paper has surveyed existing theories of board governance.  It has provided a 
broad overview of the existing state of theory, across disciplines as diverse as 
economics and theology.  Similarities and differences between theories have been 
identified.  Additionally, empirical evidence in relation to the crucial behaviors of 
board monitoring and influence have been summarized.  
Each theory has something to offer our understanding of board governance.  Our 
choice of theoretical perspectives in research should reflect the specific research 
problem we are attempting to resolve.  In the context of governance, economics 
addresses how organizational form impacts productive capacity and protection of 
assets.  Management theories offer insight into the best means of coordinating 
and controlling entities.  Sociological theories explain the institutional and social 
aspects of board functioning.  Psychology offers insights into small group 
effectiveness, and the psychoanalytic underpinnings of board dynamics. Politics 
provokes thinking about how the interests of competing stakeholders are 
accommodated, and about organizational rationality.  History raises interesting 
questions about the extent to which current corporate governance arrangements 
simply reflect the path of their development.  Theology informs the entire 
ontological system of believers, including beliefs about governance.
This paper has supported the calls for research to be better informed by the 
diversity of theory, and for research to be more context-specific in order to take 
account of the diverse organizational forms and purposes found in the third 
sector.  One of the inherently fascinating things about governance, and especially 
governance in the third sector, is its complexity.  A multi-disciplinary and multi-
theory approach will help capture that complexity.
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